2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> > > > On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 11:43 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com>wrote: > >> >> >> 2012/2/2 David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> >> >>> >>> >>> 2012/2/2 Stephen Unger <un...@cs.columbia.edu> >>>> >>>>> A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote >>>>> tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual >>>>> processing messy, to the point where even checking the reported >>>>> results of a small fraction of the precincts becomes a cumbersome, >>>>> costly operation. (Score/range voting might be workable). Note that, >>>>> even with plurality voting, manual recounts are rare. With any of the >>>>> other schemes we would be committed to faith-based elections. >>>>> >>>>> Steve >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> I wanted to mention that Approval-voting enhanced IRV and STV could be >>> tabulated at the precinct level. You let everyone rank up to 3 candidates >>> and then you use these rankings to get 3 finalists. You then sort the >>> votes into ten possible ways people could rank the 3 finalists. But if the >>> third or fourth most often ranked candidates were within a small percent of >>> each other then it would not require a manual recount. The IRV cd be done >>> with two sets of 3 candidates so there'd be twice as much sorting in the >>> 2nd round and then there'd be a manual recount if and only if there's a >>> different outcome in the two sets of candidates, which is not likely. >>> >> >> This is indeed possible, but it's several times harder than counting a >> truly summable method, especially an O(N) summable one. >> > > Explain to me what you mean by that? > > The summing of rankings in the first stage is O(N), right? > The summing of the number of votes in each of the 10 categories is O(N), > right? >
Yes. You can either do it in two rounds, or one round that's O(N^3). Either way, it's more than twice as hard as a one-round, O(N) count. > The rest is a simple EXCEL spreadsheet problem. >> > > >> And it's the only advantage of IRV3/AV3, because center >> squeeze/nonmonotonicity/Burlington still applies at full force >> > > Unless, their full force isn't that strong in real life with a dynamic > center and regular repositioning by parties. And a 20% chance of "sour > grapes" non-monotonicity in the infrequent case of a three-way competitive > race isn't enuf to change voter behavior significantly. And once again, > Burlington has gotta be downscaled in its significance given the small > margin with which IRV was rescinded and the deceptive campaign waged > against it, and the likelihood that it's pathologies would have been easily > worked out with time... > > Earth to EM, Burlington is not a smoking gun... > Earth to David. Reality doesn't care how often you repeat nice-sounding phrases about how you think IRV would usually work. Unless you give reality a chance to change you're mind, you're just fooling yourself. Jameson > dlw > >> >> Jameson >> >>> >>> dlw >>> >>> ---- >>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list >>> info >>> >>> >> >
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