If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true.
Jameson 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> > IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to > convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if > you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. > > But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many > serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over > IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more > significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight > modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first > stage. > > dlw > > On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, < > election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com> wrote: > >> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to >> election-methods@lists.electorama.com >> >> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >> >> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >> >> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >> election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com >> >> You can reach the person managing the list at >> election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com >> >> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..." >> >> Today's Topics: >> >> 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? >> (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) >> 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) >> 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) >> 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) >> 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) >> 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_el...@lavabit.com> >> To: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >> Cc: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100 >> Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? >> On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: >> >>> As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken >>> dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma. >>> Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either >>> plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would >>> have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two >>> "vote splitting" factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred >>> each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood >>> and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to >>> cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000 >>> doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not >>> have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the >>> most self-consistent counts of Florida. >>> >> >> Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was >> used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property >> would remain in a singlewinner context. >> >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> >> To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >> Cc: >> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600 >> Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >> It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets >> used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. >> >> Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. >> STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not >> complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled >> with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd >> parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. >> >> So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a >> first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring >> process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and >> 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter >> two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter >> attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates >> in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep >> it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the >> system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? >> >> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices >> or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and that both can be >> useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR >> Hare election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats a party >> wins could either be selected after the victory or specified before hand. >> >> So what do you think? >> >> I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power >> aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure they're >> wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having >> their representative and they could keep that if there are relatively few >> seats per election. >> >> dlw >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >> To: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>, >> electionsciencefoundation <electionscie...@googlegroups.com> >> Cc: >> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:20:20 -0600 >> Subject: [EM] SODA arguments >> For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure >> of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters will >> beat all other systems, including Range/Approval. >> >> For those who feel that Condorcet compliance is the be-all-and-end-all, a >> majority Condorcet winner, or any Condorcet winner with 3 candidates and >> full candidate preferences, is not just the winner with honest votes, but >> in all cases the strategically-forced winner; this contrasts with Condorcet >> systems, in which strategy can cause even majority- or 3-candidate- CWs to >> lose. >> >> For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most important, SODA >> is unmatched. It meets FBC, solves the chicken dilemma, has no burial >> incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), and even meets later-no-harm for the >> two most-approved candidates (where it matters most). It's monotonic, and I >> believe (haven't proven) that it meets consistency. It meets participation, >> cloneproofness, and IIA for up to 4 candidates. >> >> For those "middlebrows" who most value a system's acceptability to >> current incumbents, SODA is top-of-the-line. It allows voters to vote >> plurality-style and, if two parties are clearly favored by voters, allows >> those two parties to prevent a weak centrist from winning, even if >> polarization is so high that the centrist is an apparent Condorcet winner. >> >> For those who want simplicity: while it's true that the SODA counting >> process is more complicated than approval, the process of voting is >> actually simpler than any other system, because you can just vote for your >> favorite candidate. For the majority who agrees with their favorite >> candidate's preferences, there is no strategic need to watch the polls and >> figure out who the frontrunners are, and no nail-biting dilemma of whether >> to rank others as equal to your favorite. >> >> And for those who balk at delegation, SODA allows any voter to cast a >> direct, undelegated ballot; and allows those voters who do delegate to know >> how their vote will be used. Refusing to consider SODA because you don't >> want to delegate, is like refusing to walk into a candy store because you >> don't like chocolate; SODA allows, not requires, delegation. >> >> I think pretty much everybody on this list falls into one or more of the >> above categories. So, what's not to like about SODA? >> >> Jameson >> >> ps. I clarified the SODA >> procedure<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting_(Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval)#Full.2C_step-by-step_rules> >> on >> the wiki, though there were no substantive changes. I improved the >> formatting, marked the steps which are optional, and better explained that >> winning candidates use their delegated votes first because precisely >> because they will probably choose not to approve others. >> >> Comments are welcome. >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >> To: David L Wetzell <wetze...@gmail.com> >> Cc: EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:26:33 -0600 >> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >> >>> >>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked >>> choices or party-list PR. >>> >> >> I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked >> choices is too much of a burden on the voter. While either would be better >> than what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la SODA. >> >> Thus my favored system is PAL >> representation<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation>. >> It's true that PAL still has some (very attenuated) party-list-like >> aspects, because party affiliation is used to match candidates to districts >> at the end; but if you were willing to give up this (overlapping) >> geographical representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar >> delegated PR system in which parties played no explicit role. >> >> Jameson >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: "James Gilmour" <jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk> >> To: "'David L Wetzell'" <wetze...@gmail.com>, "'EM'" < >> election-methods@lists.electorama.com> >> Cc: >> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 18:01:55 -0000 >> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >> But why would you want all these differences and complications? >> >> If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these elections, why not use >> STV-PR for all of these elections to the various >> "representative assemblies" (councils, state legislatures, US House of >> Representatives, US Senate). STV-PR works OK in both >> partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair and proper >> representation of the VOTERS in all these different >> elections. >> >> Of course, with districts returning only 3 to 5 members, the >> proportionality and direct representation MAY be a little limited, but >> if small numbers are needed to make the system acceptable to the vested >> interests, then so be it. STV-PR with 3, 4 or 5 member >> districts is greatly to be preferred to plurality in single-member >> districts and to plurality at large. We had to accept local >> government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR >> package - that's practical politics. But that reform has >> transformed our local government - no more "one-party states". >> >> James Gilmour >> >> >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com >> > [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On >> > Behalf Of David L Wetzell >> > Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 2:49 PM >> > To: EM >> > Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? >> > >> > >> > It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base >> > which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed >> > about the elections. >> > >> > Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types >> > of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in >> > the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify >> > things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR >> > Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a >> > constructive role to play in US politics. >> > >> > So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps >> > using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the >> > vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional >> > elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for >> > state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two >> > elections are less important and get less media coverage and >> > voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank >> > multiple candidates in an election where they often simply >> > vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the >> > mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's >> > duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? >> > >> > It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between >> > ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of >> > context and that both can be useful, especially when no >> > explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare >> > election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats >> > a party wins could either be selected after the victory or >> > specified before hand. >> > >> > So what do you think? >> > >> > I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those >> > in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and >> > I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to >> > voting the candidate and having their representative and they >> > could keep that if there are relatively few seats per election. >> > >> > dlw >> > >> >> >> >> >> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >> From: "Markus Schulze" <markus.schu...@alumni.tu-berlin.de> >> To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com >> Cc: >> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 19:27:05 +0100 >> Subject: Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method >> Hallo, >> >> it can happen that the weakest link in the strongest path >> from candidate A to candidate B and the weakest link in the >> strongest path from candidate B to candidate A is the same link, >> say CD. >> >> I recommend that, in this case, the link CD should be declared >> "forbidden" and the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B >> and the strongest path from candidate B to candidate A, that does >> not contain a "forbidden" link, should be calculated. If again the >> weakest link in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B >> and the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to >> candidate A is the same link (say EF), then also this link should >> be declared "forbidden" and the paths from A to B and from B to A >> should be calculated. This should be repeated until the weakest >> link in the strongest path from A to B and the weakest link in the >> strongest path from B to A are different links. >> >> Markus Schulze >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Election-Methods mailing list >> Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com >> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com >> >> > > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > >
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