Hi Jameson, Just a few thoughts. De : Jameson Quinn <jameson.qu...@gmail.com> >À : EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>; electionsciencefoundation ><electionscie...@googlegroups.com> >Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 9h20 >Objet : [EM] SODA arguments > > For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval.
I guess you will have a hard time arguing this, especially if you have multiple audiences. For instance, whether Range/Approval are even all that great is controversial. But if you're an anti-majoritarian type or think it's unfair/unrealistic to propose that voters are strategic, I guess that SODA looks like a step down. Didn't you post an example where SODA declined to elect a "weak CW" that you said was actually a good thing? If that's true, I guess some people won't agree with that. It seems to me that there would be a lot more candidates under SODA. It's pretty hard to spoil the race and there is benefit to be had in receiving some votes. It seems parliamentary that way. How many supporters is too few to consider running? (I have a simple rule for cutting down the number of candidates. I don't think I've ever mentioned it because I know how idealistic you all are. Just say that the first-preference winner auto-wins if he has more first preferences than second and third place combined. This can make it risky even to compete for third place. The idea is that voters should definitely then realize which candidates are the top three in their race, which could amount to a viability/visibility boost for #3. My rule assumes there's no equal-ranking, but I bet something could be devised for other ballots.) Kevin
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