I've said seemingly contradictory things about IRV. It's particularly flagrant FBC failure makes it entirely inadequate for public political elections, more so than Condorcet, which, too, is inadequate due to FBC failure.
And I also said that IRV would be a fine method, were it not for the public's inclination towards resigned, cowed overcompromise, and their very sad and disastrous lowering of standards for acceptability. "Vote for the least bad of the corrupt candidates, because they're the winnable ones". But how could IRV be alright, even with better voting? Wouldn't people wanting to maximize their expectation still favorite-bury sometimes? Sure. But if their judgement was at all reasonable, they wouldn't do so in a way that would bother me. It comes down to what one calls "acceptable". IRV's strategy in non-u/a elections would be especially complicated to describe, but it's a sure thing that it would often involve favorite-burial, to maximize a voter's expectation. Without knowing the details on how to vote (no method matches Approval's clearly-defined simple strategy, for any kind of election), voters would still do favorite-burial. As with Approval, and probably all methods, IRV's expectation-maximizing strategy is simpler in a u/a election. But that doesn't mean that it's simple enough for anyone to know what it is, exactly. IRV has two great advantages: It is, as I understand it, entirely defection-proof. And it meets the Mutual Majority Criterion. If we had the kind of electorate who could handle FBC failure, then we could discuss the relative desirability of Condorcet and IRV. But we needn't bother, because they both fail FBC, disqualifying both of them under existing conditions. Anyway, ICT has all of what I consider to be the most important properties. Regrettably, of course, it's almost surely too complicated to be considered as a first proposal. But, when the public are more informed and used to voting system reform, ICT would become a good proposal. ICT is probably the best, unless something much more complicated could improve on it. to be continued Mike Ossipoff
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