...but wouldn't it be better not to have the disadvantags? As you suggested, if Condorcet were proposed municipally, maybe (as was the case with IRV in some municipalities) big outside money won't come in to emphasize rank-balloting methods complete novelty, unknown-ness, unfamiliarity and unpredictability.
But maybe the reason why that wasn't always done to IRV proposals was because the big opponents knew that IRV wasn't going to really improve on Pluralilty anyway, given current electorates. And you further suggested, when people become familiar with Condorcet's properties, by experience in municipal use, maybe they'll realize that FBC violations are rare--usually no one will regret ranking their favorite in 1st place. Right, and a good enough boxer might be able to win while holding one hand behind his back. Heroic, but maybe not the best idea. Why would we want to have the disadvantages of Condorcet, if they can be avoided? Not only would approval have an incomparably better chance for relatively quick national adoption, but Approval (nothing other than an elimination of Plurality's nonsensical falsification-requirement) rightfully qualifies as a voting-rights issue, a rights remedy that could and should be required by the courts. And, if anyone is going to propose something more complicated than Approval, it should be something that better gets rid of the co-operation/defection problem (C/D). ICT greately mitigates that problem, is defection-resistant. That can't be said for Condorcet. Compare Condorcet and ICT in the usual Approval bad-example, the 27,24,49 example. Mike Ossipoff
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