Juho:
You asked if I'd answer questions that you say remain unanswered. Of course. I answer all questions. If there's a question that I haven't answered, then let me know. But please be specific. You said: My opinion is that the biggest problem of Approval is the difficulty of voters to find a working strategy when there are more than two poential winners [endquote] You see, that is why I say that you haven't been reading my postings, and haven't read my article. My article described a number of easy and simple strategies for Approval, for those who want strategy. But I emphasized that my first recommendation is to just vote for candidates that you like, trust, or who deserve your support. That isn't has hard as you seem to think. It's usually pretty obvious which candidates qualify. And I've discussed this more in my most recent postings here at EM: One: No one knows for sure exactly what way of voting (by hir and some hypothetical same-preferring and same-voting faction) will give the best outcome. ....That's true in Condorcet as well as in Approval. Two: In Approval, if you like strategy, I've given simple instructions for determining the way of voting that maximizes your expectation. I've described it for u/a elections, .....and for non-u/a elections. Three: In Condorcet, you don't have a known strategy for maximizing expectation. In a u/a election you have, instead, a ridiculous dilemma, and no hint of what will maximize ......your expectation. In fact, in general, expectation-maximizing strategy is not available in Condorcet. I'll reply to the rest of your recent postings within a few days. Mike Ossipoff (e.g. when there are two candidates from one wing and one from the other). Also Plurality has related problems with strategy, but in Plurality (in a two-party system) a good strategy is to vote for one of the two dominant parties. In Approval the voter may not have any such safe strategy option.
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