[Note: Michael Ossipof's message was not a reply to a mail on this list but to an offline discussion.]
On 21.5.2012, at 23.13, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > I don't know what you mean by "all regular voters". I requested strategy descriptions that would be intended for real life elections and normal voters (not EM experts) in such elections. That means that the strategy shall be clear enough so that normal voters can implement it. > The above strategy is for voters who perceive the above-desecribed conditions. > If you want a general strategy for Condorcet, none is known. Also strategies that do work only under specific conditions are ok. You just have to write the strategy description so that a regular voter can see when that strategy can be applied and when not. I don't require that a "general" strategy should be used (=modify your vote) in every election. It is enough if there is a strategy that can be applied reasonably often, and that will clearly improve the outcome from that voter's point of view. I encourage you to rewrite the strategy so that it clearly indicates when a voter should use it and how the vote should be modified. A working strategy for public elections must be such that regular voters can successfully implement it (or get strategic guidance e.g. from his party and implement that strategy). > I have no idea what examples you're referring to. You identified two of your examples by giving their "characteristic numbers", 27,24,49 and 33,32,34. I found and commented the latter one in a mail (http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2012-May/030400.html). > If you want to say that one of them isn't good enough, then you need to > clearly specify it, and then tell what's wrong with it, and why you think so. I hope the mail was clear enough. Maybe you did not notice that mail since you did not comment it yet. > Juho says: > > That would make the strategy a working strategy (although not necessarily a > strategy that would work often). > > [endquote] > > Then it wouldn't be a general strategy, would it. I used term "general" just to indicate that the voter can refer to that strategy description in all elections and check what it says, not that it would always lead to a modified vote. > Ok, but which Approval article? > > [endquote] > > The one that I posted to EM. The one that is at Democracy Chronicles. Google gave me this: http://www.democracychronicles.com/2012/05/06/problems-current-voting-system-plurality-voting/. It seems to be the correct one since it talks about Approval strategies at the end. > Do you mean that you only want your favorite to win? Then, in Approval, > approve hir only. This doesn't sound like a good strategy. You know well that there are better Approval strategies. > If you want to maximize your expection, I've told Approval strategy for that > purpose. What I'm missing is a description of the strategy in an exact format that can be used by regular voters. (But I think I got one for Approval at least towards the end of this mail. Only Condorcet strategy still missing.) > But if you're questioning the assumption that people wouldn't strategize in > Approval, I merely suggest voting for all whom you like. If you want to, you > can strategize. Suit yourself. Yes, that is what I meant. And I'm still confused with your idea that people would choose between those two options in a competitive election. “Would I rather appoint him/her to office than hold the election?” > What should I provide? I'm willing to be more concrete if you tell me what > you want. > > [endquote] > > In general, what you should provide is the specifics of what you mean. You > never do that, and no doubt you never will. That's why talking to you is a > waste of time. > > In particular, in this instance, you speak of focusing on concrete practical > strategic vulnerabilities. I suggested that you specify and focus on one. You say that Condorcet is vulnerable to strategies. I say that it is not enough to sow that in theory some modification in the votes would give a better winner to the strategists to prove a practical vulnerability. I say that in order to prove that there is a practical vulnerability one must be able to give practical guidelines on how some strategy can be applied successfully in real life elections when the voters have some poll information available. You can pick any vulnerability type that you think is easiest to take benefit of. If I'd pick one strategy that would be a limitation to you. On the Approval side you say that Approval works fine. I say that there are situations where Approval fails in the sense that the voters don't have any reasonable strategies. You should pick the strategy that works in all situations. I'm to point out the vulnerabilities based on that given strategy, e.g. by providing examples of situations where that strategy does not work well enough. I provided at least one problematic Approval example to you although I did not yet get yet any exact definition of a recommended Approval strategy that voters could use when planning how to vote. >> The direct implementation of better-than-expectation could just consist of >> approving the candidates who are better than (or maybe exactly as good as) >> the result-merit that you expect from the election. > I said "(or maybe exactly as good as)" because approving a candidate who is > exactly as good as your expectation doesn't affect your expectatation. It > doesn't matter whether or not you approve a candidate who is exactly as good > as your expectation. You can flip a coin, or yes, go by how you feel that day. Ok. Random or free choice in the case of a "tie". > Juho says: > > Does "result-merit that you expect" mean the value of the (single) guessed > winner or maybe the weighted average of potential winners? > > [endquote] > > Answer to both questions: Yes, if that's what you feel that you know, or have > a perception or feel about. > > People are not going to determine their expectation in the election by > multiplying the win probability of each candidate by hir utility, and summing > the products. But you can do that if you want to. > > > But you know how good a result you expect from the election. I take that to mean that voters are expected to estimate (at some level) the value of each candidate and the probability of each candidate to win, and then estimate what the value of the outcome is likely to be. They need not do that mathematically. It is enough if their "general feeling" to some extent approximates the mathematical formula. (Actually I think that the equation is more detailed since people have different weights e.g. for uncertainty and risks. But let's forget that for now and consider this to be a good enough equation.) > Juho says: > > Does the expectation refer to the sincere opinions or does it include the > expected strategic voting too (much more complicated and cyclic)? > > [endquote] > > ...if you want it to. Ok. I take that to mean, if the voters take that into account in their considerations. It seems that this is finally an exact definition of an Approval strategy. It is not quite user friendly since I don't expect normal voters to understand much about expectation values. Actually the article (see above) contained one classical definition of Approval strategy that says pretty much the same thing and that voters might understand better (although you had your doubts about it too). It was “Would I rather appoint him/her to office than hold the election?”. Also this may be too difficult for many voters, which is not good for Approval (many voters will not follow the strategy). But I'll take this strategy (with either definition) as your recommended strategy for voters in competitive elections. I think I'll come back to that in another mail to see how well this strategy works. If you have a similar exact strategy description available for taking benefit of the claimed Condorcet vulnerabilities, that would be welcome, and actually needed to make the strategy credible. Juho
---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
