On May 27, 2012, at 5:12 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 27.5.2012, at 22.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You know, that's the Condorcetists' and IRVists' objection to
Approval.
The question is what happens when Approval doesn't let you vote
A>B>C. The difference is that there is no division to minor and
major candidates. The worst Approval problems appear when there are
three or more potential winners.
It does not take that long. As soon as ability to vote for A=B is in
your future you think of wanting ability to vote for
Favorite>Comprmise, as is doable in IRV - matters only that Favorite
is your favorite, not the possibility of Favorite actually winning.
Mike O's voters seem to think slower:
after the 1st Approval election, in which the non-Republocrat
parties and candidates have somehow managed to make at least some
people
aware of their different platforms, policies and proposals, the count
results are going to show many more votes for non-Republocrats, now
that
everyone, for the first time, has the freedom to rate anyone as they
themselves choose to, and no longer constrained by the lesser-of-2-
evils
problem.
The first Approval elections in a former two-party system could go
really well if we assume that the third parties won't be potential
winners yet.
Don't Democrat and Republican candidates continually offer
"change"? :-)
They promise those things because they know that the public want
those
things. But the public will now notice that they don't offer
squat, in
regards to those things.
This is a problem of all political systems, also when there are
multiple parties. The problem may be one step worse in a two-party
system where these two parties are almost guaranteed to return back
to power soon, whatever they do.
With voters able to vote for favorites, lesser-of-2-evils, etc., the
vote counts will more usefully indicate the popularity of candidates -
making nominating candidates more useful for lesser parties.
DWK
Juho
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