You explanation sounds like a pretty regular ranked ballot approach. If I rank U and V second, I want them to lose to the firsts and win the rest.
Juho On 3.10.2012, at 6.06, Michael Ossipoff wrote: > Juho: > > In improved Condorcet, the voter who equal top ranks X and Y, or who > equal bottom ranks W and Z, doesn't have any more power to vote one > over the other, or to not do so, than any otther voter has to vote one > candidate over the other or no do so. > > Nor does a vote for X over Y, or for Y over X, counted for the ballot > of a voter top ranking X and Y, have any more power or effect as a > pairwise vote cast by any voter between any two candidates. > Likewise for the equal bottom ranking voter who ranks W and Z at > bottom. ("at bottom" means not voted over anyone). > > So then, what makes Improved Condorcet different from unimproved > Condorcet? How is it more favorable to the equal top or equal bottom > ranking voter, without giving undue power to that voter?: > > With respect to X and Y, hir ballot is counted in hir beat interest, > in keeping with hir preferences, intent and wishes. > > As for what that means, I'll say it again: > > If you rank X and Y both in 1st place, that means that you'd rather > elect one of them (either one of them) than anyone whom you don't rank > in 1st place. > > If you rank W and Z at bottom, that means that you'd rather elect > anyone whom you rank above bottom, instead of W or Z. > > Mike Ossipoff > ---- > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info