Forest-- All Condorcet methods have some possible incentive for the Condorcet offensive strategies, of burial and offensive truncation.
I don't know of Benham, Woodall, and Schwartz Woodall have less of that incentive than other Condorcet methods, such as Beatpath, etc. Maybe. But the important difference between those 3 Condorcet IRV hybrids and other Condorcet methods is that they meet the Mutual Majority Criterion, are free of the Chicken dilemma, while meeting the Condorcet Criterion. In fact, they meet the Smith Criterion too, and so I guess the statement could be shortened to: They meet Smith and are free of the chicken dilemma. They're the only methods that I know of that have that combination of properties. I don't know the properties and criterion-compliances of the Covered version that you spoke of--as regards Smith, chicken dilemma, and burial incentive and vulnerability. But it's more complicated to define, which makes it more difficult to propose. That could only be justified by a considerable gain in properties. Michael Ossipoff ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info