Hi. Michael Allan wrote: > Issue Guiding Primary Decisive Authority > ============ =========================== ======================== > > Forced Legislative (tax law) [1] Assembly > revenue > > Unforced Planning (production) [2] Executive (sub-office) > revenue > Planning (donation) [2] RAC pledger [3] > + executive (sub-office) > ------------ --------------------------- ------------------------ > Forced - (supplier contracts) None > expenditures > Legislative [1] Assembly > (statutory expenses) > > Unforced Planning (expenditures) [2] Executive (sub-office) > expenditures + budget (expenditures) [4] + executive (finance) > > ============ =========================== ======================== > Budget ??? Executive (finance) > + assembly > > - - - - - - - - - - - - > + judiciary (all > decisions) > > We need two primaries for the unforced expenditures, and two deciders. > On the primary side (left), the planning drafts for each program (or > service etc.) must include their own budgets, specifically each must > project the expenditures of the program. These are either fixed (a > number), or functions of program size, or other execution variables. > These data are pulled into the two types of budget primary > (expenditures and whole budget). Now participants in the expenditures > budgetary primary know how many votes a program needs in order to run, > or to reach a preferred size, or capability, etc. If it hasn't enough > primary votes, they'll know they need to campaign, or increase the > turnout, or turn their efforts to saving other programs. > I see.
> On the decision side (right), the officer nominated to run the program > decides whether to run it at all, and according to which plan (which > variant draft from the planning primary). So this decision affects > actual expenditures. Meanwhile, the finance officer for the overall > budget has the authority to make changes here as well, of course. > Ok. > Although this is a complex practice, it looks like we're rationalizing > it fairly well. None of the primaries is looking to be too complex in > itself, not even the whole budget. The budget drafters need only > choose which programs put forward by the nominated officers must be > cancelled (not viable) or given haircuts in order to arrive at the > correct balance with revenue. The correct balance (deficit or > surplus) can be guided by a separate policy primary. Ok. > > It looks like we could almost generate a default budget automatically > from simple rules (again input from policy primaries), and then tweak > the draft to correct anomolies. Even the voting in the whole-budget > primary might be simplified by a convention: vote for the draft that > imposes the fewest tweaks, because it's likely to be the truest to the > myriad of input primaries (what we're asking for). Moreover, since > each necessary tweak signals an anomoly in the input primaries (like > asking for what's impossible), we might eliminate even those residual > tweaks by shifting our votes in the input primaries and resolving the > anomolies. The primary budget might then be determined wholly from > the input of external primaries; the whole-budget drafters *per se* > (the tweakers) being effectively removed from the process in the end. Yes, very good and very interesting. On the other hand executives or committees can be given power if the input primaries [3] would assign it to them unforced via [2]. So executive action can still be supportive in swift ways if this is seen necessary. > > The finance officer offered such a "perfect" primary budget need only > be concerned with executing it. He/she would be purely an executive. > That's perhaps the dream of every executive. The clearer the mandate > (what ought to be) the greater the power to make it a fact (what is). Yes, especially if the whole planning is already done in process and the plan is kept up-to-date in near realtime. While being binding for a determined period, this still helps to assign resources for the next budget, which can already be planned with to a certain degree by the executive (after all this is an important qualification for office) and help expand executive power where it is necessary now. Maybe SemanticMediawiki can already cover that since the mapping only has to go from the right [3] to the budget primary on the left [2]. Pledges still propagate through the tree of the input primary with its pipes, yet they are patched until they may become the executive plan in which case only the mapping is necessary (one query, right?). To project different none majority versions of the plan (yet unpatched propasals as patched/applied) one needed a different tool/algorithm. For this we need changes to semantic properties logged or somehow queryable. This also needs a fast incremental counting, maybe like I proposed. (1) conseo (1) http://zelea.com/w/User:4consensus_WebDe/Trees_of_Transactions This has to be adjusted for the pipe indirection. Resources then flow through the pipes of the projected officers/executives and patching (resource flow) can be projected on different branches of the plan. The programmability would be in the pipes now (?). You could in fact write programatic descriptions of executive behaviour, freeing the executive to stear and programmatically expand and connect the process (e.g. with other executives' programs or production systems). The programs would be embedded in the drafts (hence collective procedure) and the executive is responsible for running them. This is all optional. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info