On 6 May 2013, at 2:08 PM, Jonathan Denn <i...@agreater.us> wrote: > > Plurality voting without the Electoral College > > In a three way race for POTUS. Let's say we have the traditional D and R. A > fringe third party candidate runs and is widely hated (H) by everyone except > his/her supporters. But the final results are > > H 34% > D 33% > R 33% > > Now the hated candidate is leader of the free world. > > In Approval Voting, I think it unlikely in this hyper-partisan country that > many voters will vote for D & R, and not H. So the results might very well be > the same. > > Is this a legit flaw for Approval? It seems quite plausible to me.
Sure. Suppose the plurality numbers (could be approval with 100% bullet voting) were: H 32 R 33 D 35 D wins. But suppose that 5 D's decide to approve R in an effort to avoid the possible election of H, but the R's are determined to bullet-vote: H 32 R 38 D 35 Oops. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
