dlw > > > Plurality voting and limited voting (and the Borda count if the voters > are undisciplined) are about the only methods that _cannot_ handle 3 or > (maybe) 4 popular choices along with any number of unpopular choices. >
So you agree that IRV works w. relatively few popular candidates? > > > So it seems disengaged from reality to let C, the number of candidates, > > go to infinity... and if a lot of candidates are not going to get > > elected then to disregard voter info/preference over them is of much > > less consequence. > > Although the number of popular candidates is now small, that's because > we use plurality voting. When we use better voting methods, the number > of popular candidates will increase; of course not to infinity, but > frequently beyond the 3 or 4 popular choices that IRV can handle with > fairness. > dlw: This is a conjecture. One that I don't think makes economic sense when one considers all that is entailed with a competitive campaign for an important single-seat election. > > Although it's a non-governmental example, take a look at the current > VoteFair American Idol poll. The number of popular music genres is > about 5, and there are about 7 singers who get more than a few > first-choice votes. > > http://www.votefair.org/cgi-bin/votefairrank.cgi/votingid=idols > > IRV would correctly identify the most popular music genre (based on > current results), but probably would not correctly identify the most > popular singer. > Apples and Oranges. There's no serious economic costs to competing in American Idol and so the number of competitive singers is not naturally hampered by that and the need for a large support base or expensive advertisements or connections for important endorsements. > > Why would voters trust a voting method that stops getting fair results > with so few popular candidates? > Because when one considers the potential candidates have for taking on ideas, there isn't a need for a large number of candidates to make the de facto center much more like the true center. Only among theorists does one constrain candidates to fixed positions in policy-spaces. > > Yes, IRV is easy to explain, but that advantage becomes unimportant as > the number of popular candidates increases, which it will when better > voting methods are adopted. > That may be your story, but when one adds realism with folks able to express voice thru other means besides voting then it becomes less important to amp up C much. The non-competitive candidates can still move the center. And the opportunity cost of trying to settle on an alternative alternative to FPTP than IRV will become apparent. dlw > > Richard Fobes > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Mon, 27 May 2013 20:54:22 -0400 > From: Warren D Smith <warren....@gmail.com> > To: electionscience <electionscie...@googlegroups.com>, > election-methods <election-meth...@electorama.com> > Subject: [EM] NY state "fair elections" public funding bill (comments > asap please?) > Message-ID: > <CAAJP7Y2NMPdzBaYnW-Q_xwaQhhrkjgC= > h5gyzxvm4qkrv1_...@mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 > > http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?sh=printbill&bn=S04705&term=2013 > > > ------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Election-Methods mailing list > Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com > http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com > > > End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 107, Issue 16 > ************************************************* >
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