Hi Forest,
>________________________________
> De : Forest Simmons <fsimm...@pcc.edu>
>À : EM <election-methods@lists.electorama.com>
>Envoyé le : Dimanche 6 octobre 2013 17h21
>Objet : [EM] Try this method on your favorite election scenario
>
>Ballots are ranked or rated. If ranked, then equal ranking and truncation are
>allowed.
>
>Let IA stand for Implicit Approval, which for any candidate X is the number of
>ballots on which X is ranked or rated above bottom, i.e. neither truncated nor
>rated at zero.
>
>Let MPO stand for maximum pairwise opposition, which (for candidate X) is the
>maximum (as Y varies over the other candidates) of the number of ballots on
>which a strict preference of Y over X is indicated.
>
>The winner of this method (IA/MPO) is the candidate with the highest ratio of
>IA to MPO.
>
>Example
>
>45 A>B
>35 B>C
>20 C
>
>For A IA is 45 and MPO is 55, so IA/MPO is 45/55 or 9/11.
>For B IA is 80 and MPO is 45, so IA/MPO is 80/45 or 16/9.
>For C IA is 55 and MPO is 80, so IA/MPO is 55/80 or 11/16.
>
>The IA/MPO winner is B.
>
>If, instead, the A faction votes 45 A, then the ratios become ...
>
>For A (the same) 9/11.
>For B IA is 35 and MPO is still 45, so the ratio is 7/9.
>For C IA is still 55 and MPO is 45, so the ratio is 11/9.
>
>This time C wins.
IA/MPO seems like a pretty good method. It seems to be guaranteed that at least
one candidate will have a score >= 100%. That's elegant. With that assumption
it seems easy to demonstrate that the method satisfies Plurality and
SDSC/Minimal Defense.
My guess is that it must satisfy FBC since the component scores each do, and
the only "processing" is taking the ratio.
I suspect that we have lost SFC compared to MMPO ("Strategy-Free": roughly, if
A has a majority over B and there is no majority over A, B can't win), but it
might be hard to contrive a failure scenario.
If it's right that IA/MPO satisfies FBC, MD, and Plurality, it's not in a
crowded space... Though MAMPO satisfies those as well as SFC, it's probably
less sensitive to the rankings. (MDDA has SFC but can fail Plurality.)
I should get my simulations running again. I seem to recall being disappointed
with the performance of MDDA and MAMPO.
Kevin Venzke
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