On Tue, 2019-11-19 at 16:15 -0500, Frank Ch. Eigler wrote: > Hi - > > > > [...] What I want is simply make it easy for the user to say where > > they expect the sources are. So there is no surprises. > > If this were a mandate, it would be a hassle, for any build that's > more than one directory wide.
It wouldn't be mandatory. It just wouldn't be the default. > > > The compiled-in default for the binary is off. The systemd service > > > default, it happens to be on, but it's configured to serve only > > > privileged directories that people with bad compilers cannot sneak > > > binaries into. People running personal servers can/should use -F as > > > they see fit. In the context of a normal workgroup - it's fine. > > > > So -F seems fine for the later, just not for the former. > > IMHO, even the former seems okay and even desirable: > > debuginfod -F /usr/lib/debug > > is a safe & easy way to relay the contents of all the debuginfo rpms > that were installed, to nearby clients. All those binaries come from > packages/distros, so are at least as high quality & trustworthiness as > the user's own. Again I offer to do an audit of some distro debuginfo > that all their source refs are milquetoast like /usr/include or > /usr/src/debug. Sure, you could use that if you wanted to share your whole build/source trees and don't mind serving any other files on some local network. I just think it shouldn't be the default. If you go look for odd paths in .debug files you probably will find them. We already know some builds generate and/or build files in /tmp or outside the src/builddir. I'll look to see what is necessary to make sure none of those leak out by default. > > > System certs do not serve to authenticate clients. Client > > > certificates are per-user things that come with their own management > > > headaches. Will think about authentication matters in the future. > > > > I thought ca-certificates.crt were normally used to authenticate > > remote servers. > > ca-certificates.crt types of files (or /usr/share/pki/ files) are the > trust roots for validating the *servers'* certificates. They are > generally provided by the distro, so can't possibly serve as unique > *client* authentication. I think we are talking past each other here. I am not really interested in "client certificates". I am simply interested in knowing what is done for outgoing https connections to be authenticated. What would it take to use the trust roots for validating the server certificates? Thanks, Mark