In the post below, Mr. O'Connell narrates a story, and concludes, "... but it is all on me; and if I fail to find a problem and allow it to go to production, then the problem is not systemic. Either I screwed up, or I was ignored."
Mr. O'Connell is absolutely correct that individuals make decisions, and credit and blame can be assigned to said individuals. The issue I tried to raise is, if he was ignored, why was he ignored? It was the reason behind that which was a systemic problem. On average, people function within an organization per the rules and mores of that organization. Those who do not, usually leave, or if they are strong enough, they change the organization. But the latter sort of people are few and far between, and one cannot count on a minute minority to offset an ingrained organizational structure and direction. An organization must be headed in the right direction in order to get to the proper destination; one tugboat cannot offset the speed and direction of an ocean liner under full steam. Ken Javor Phone: (256) 650-5261 > From: Brian O'Connell <oconne...@tamuracorp.com> > Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2009 14:44:21 -0800 > To: <EMC-PSTC@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG> > Subject: RE: [PSES] Emissions from Computer power supplies > > Some of these threads cause me to meta-think. > > I have just looked at some trend lines slowly creep across the monitor that > represent several parameters of a box that is running under an abnormal > operating condition. I come back to the test bench from an environmental > chamber, where I am torturing something else - then I am thinking about how I > am thinking about Thiokol, EADS (Ariane 501), AECL (Therac-25), etc. Yes, what > I am doing is much less complex, but it is all on me; and if I fail to find a > problem and allow it to go to production, then the problem is not systemic. > Either I screwed up, or I was ignored. > > At a PREVIOUS place of employee, I was pulled into a managers' meeting. When > it was evident that they were going to ignore my advice, I said "Good people, > it seems that we are having a Morton Thiokol moment". > > With much respect to Mr Javor, I do not believe in a "systemic problem". > Sometime, somewhere, there was a singular decision to take a risk, or deny > that there is a significant risk. > > R/S, > Brian > > -----Original Message----- > From: emc-p...@ieee.org [mailto:emc-p...@ieee.org]On Behalf Of Ken Javor > Sent: Friday, December 18, 2009 12:24 PM > To: EMC-PSTC@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG > Subject: Re: [PSES] Emissions from Computer power supplies - update > > I offer a slightly different interpretation of the O-ring tragedy than Messrs. > McDiarmid and Mr. O¹Connell et al. > > As at many other large organizations, there is a strong line of demarcation > between management and engineering responsibilities within NASA. This results > in a Balkanization of priorities, where management is primarily concerned with > getting the job done, and the engineers are primarily concerned with getting > things right. Managers come up the ranks from engineering, but once they > move up a few levels they are in charge of engineering disciplines they do not > understand well. At that point, they have to rely on engineers¹ inputs to > make important decisions concerning issues they do not fully understand. > > When engineers on average appear to have a strongly vested position in no risk > at the expense of schedule, and when the suggestions they offer, again on > average, do not support schedules and appear to be self-serving in that they > are overly conservative, then on average managers begin to lose faith in > engineering¹s inputs, and they rely more and more on their own gut feel. That > works only as long as the decision is rooted in a discipline the manager > understands, but it can be disastrous when he is outside his area of > competency. > > I liken this to the fable of the little boy who cried wolf. When managers > repeatedly get answers they cannot use from engineering, engineering loses > credibility, and management cannot tell the difference between a real warning, > and business as usual. > > In conclusion, I am saying this is a systemic problem, in that the > organizational split in job priorities results in a severing of authority, and > responsibility. Once that happens, the organization decision making process > is damaged. > > Ken Javor > > Phone: (256) 650-5261 > > From: <ralph.mcdiar...@ca.schneider-electric.com> > Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2009 11:02:54 -0800 > To: <EMC-PSTC@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG> > Subject: Re: [PSES] Emissions from Computer power supplies - update > > > As I recall, the NASA rocket booster O-ring tragedy was attributed to putting > programme schedule above all other concerns. > _____________________________________ ________________________________________ > _______ > > Ralph McDiarmid | Schneider Electric | Renewable Energies Business | > CANADA | Project Technologist > Phone: +1-604-422-2622 | Fax: +1-604-421-3029 | > Email: ralph.mcdiar...@ca.schneider-electric.com > <mailto:ralph.mcdiar...@ca.schneider-electric.com> | Site: www.xantrex.com > <http://www.xantrex.com/> | Address: 8999 Nelson Way, Burnaby, BC V5A 4B5, > CANADA > > *** Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail > > From: John Woodgate <j...@jmwa.demon.co.uk> > To: EMC-PSTC@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG > Date: 12/18/2009 10:56 AM > Subject: Re: [PSES] Emissions from Computer power supplies - update > > In message > <690230e9cf51aa4ebf639fae9216d5b1015a4...@mer2-exchrec1.echostar.com>, > dated Fri, 18 Dec 2009, "Grasso, Charles" <charles.gra...@echostar.com> > writes: > >> Sorry Brian - I guess I do not understand your position. Are you saying >> that North American companies are not requiring compliant product? > > It's almost certainly a lot more complicated than just a blatant 'Ship > us non-compliant product.' Remember NASA's 'O-rings'? Delinquency is > most often spread thinly through both supplier and customer. > -- > OOO - Own Opinions Only. Try www.jmwa.demon.co.uk <www.jmwa.demon.co.uk> and > www.isce.org.uk <www.isce.org.uk> > John Woodgate, J M Woodgate and Associates, Rayleigh, Essex UK > > - > ---------------------------------------------------------------- > This message is from the IEEE Product Safety Engineering Society emc-pstc > discussion list. To post a message to the list, send your e-mail to > <emc-p...@ieee.org> > > All emc-pstc postings are archived and searchable on the web at: > http://www.ieeecommunities.org/emc-pstc > Graphics (in well-used formats), large files, etc. can be posted to that URL. > > Website: http://www.ieee-pses.org/ > Instructions: http://listserv.ieee.org/request/user-guide.html > List rules: http://www.ieee-pses.org/listrules.html > > For help, send mail to the list administrators: > Scott Douglas <emcp...@socal.rr.com> > Mike Cantwell <mcantw...@ieee.org> > > For policy questions, send mail to: > Jim Bacher: <j.bac...@ieee.org> > David Heald: <dhe...@gmail.com> - This message is from the IEEE Product Safety Engineering Society emc-pstc discussion list. To post a message to the list, send your e-mail to <emc-p...@ieee.org> All emc-pstc postings are archived and searchable on the web at: http://www.ieeecommunities.org/emc-pstc Graphics (in well-used formats), large files, etc. can be posted to that URL. Website: http://www.ieee-pses.org/ Instructions: http://listserv.ieee.org/request/user-guide.html List rules: http://www.ieee-pses.org/listrules.html For help, send mail to the list administrators: Scott Douglas <emcp...@socal.rr.com> Mike Cantwell <mcantw...@ieee.org> For policy questions, send mail to: Jim Bacher: <j.bac...@ieee.org> David Heald: <dhe...@gmail.com>
