Hi--OOO is the least abstract and generalizing of any ontology in the West since the Pre-Socratics.
Everyone else pretty much reduces things to substance, fire, water, atoms, quantum fluctuations, ideas, etc. We don't--waffle maker a is irreducibly not b, and not simply because it looks different to me. Tim http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com On Jun 24, 2012, at 4:44 AM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: > I agree, this is a good starting point.... that all things that exist > have being as their common condition of existence (that is, they are > not "not beings"), which is a sort of foundational ontological > similarity. But if the only significant ontological claim we can make > about things is either yes or no, do they exist or not, then this > means all things carry this single quality, which is to say that there > is no difference between things. If we admit difference, then we must > account for those differences in meaningful ways. For instance, > waffle #1 differs from waffle #2 in a different way than waffle #1 > differs from a toaster (or waffle #1 changes in the course of being > eaten, it is still in one meaningful sense the "same" waffle after it > has been bitten, but in another sense, it is a different waffle, too. > While both toasters and waffles are different from something like an > idea or a "memory" rendered in media (a waffle recipe or story about > waffles) or a process habituated in muscle memory (the habit of making > a waffle or eating one). > > My concern is that if we reduce all that can be known about being to a > simple recognition of being, we commit to a kind of abstraction and > alienation from being of the sort that happens when markets try to > mediate everything through the common denominator of dollars. > > Davin > > On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:46 PM, Timothy Morton > <timothymorton...@gmail.com> wrote: >> Hi Davin, >> >> We obviously treat different entities differently. >> >> But this is not the same as saying that these entities are ontologically >> different. >> >> Yours, Tim >> >> >> >> http://www.ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com >> >> On Jun 20, 2012, at 5:51 AM, davin heckman <davinheck...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Thank you Ian, for these thoughts. My initial encounter with this >>> work came via a brief discussion of "flat ontology," which I found >>> somewhat offputting. I followed up by reading through the re:press >>> book. What I like the most, I suppose, is the sense that the >>> discussions are in motion with a lot of people participating. >>> >>> Reading some of the discussion of mereology, I find they resonate with >>> one of my favorite passages from Hegel. Pardon me for cannibalizing >>> another piece of writing (a draft of which can be found here: >>> http://isea2011.sabanciuniv.edu/paper/disturbed-dialectic-literary-criticism). >>> * >>> In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel describes the dialectical process: >>> >>> "The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one >>> might say the former is refuted by the latter; similarly, when the >>> fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false >>> manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of >>> it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another, >>> they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the >>> same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in >>> which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary >>> as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of >>> the whole." [1] >>> >>> Viewed from within the Hegelian process, the Real is positioned >>> outside its present manifestations, consisting, rather, of the dynamic >>> processes that comprise its totality. >>> >>> This insight, crucial to critical practice, requires revision in light >>> of technical change. By revision, I do not mean that we need to >>> fundamentally alter Hegel’s argument, I only mean to suggest that we >>> see this passage with respect to new temporal modalities that have >>> shaken up the pursuit of knowledge. >>> * >>> I come at many of the same issues, but my inclination lead me to >>> embrace a kind of "humanism," but one which cannot easily understand >>> as we continually muddle the conversations of humanism with an >>> ontology that is expressed in our metaphors. One grip I have with the >>> use of Deleuze or McLuhan, is the idea that our capacity to >>> personalize prosthetics has a tendency to be reduced to a situation in >>> which it becomes possible to imagine that we see machines, >>> interpersonal relationships, people with tools, etc. as the same >>> thing. When, in fact, my psychic investment in my bike or computer, >>> while deep, is not nearly as deep or as complex as my psychic >>> investment in my (which I can only refer to as mine with a sense of >>> obligation to, rather than ownership over) child. If my bike decided >>> to bite me.....which it can't, even if it can hurt me.... I would not >>> feel so simultaneously restrained in my response AND emotionally >>> florid as I would if my 8 year old bit me for some crazy reason (but >>> with my three year old, I he is only a missed nap away from engaging >>> in something so obvious and horrible as biting someone). A bike, on >>> the other hand, can hurt me a lot more than a bite from a toddler, and >>> I suppose I am not above kicking a bike and yelling.... but I have >>> very limited feelings about a bike malfunction or hitting my thumb >>> with a hammer. On the other hand, a bike goes wherever I want it to >>> go (except when there's an accident)..... a toddler, not so much.... >>> an eight year old, he usually comes with a counter proposal (and it is >>> a monstrous adult that would treat kids like a bike, insist that they >>> only go where told, speak when it is demanded). A lot of really deep >>> thinking about human subjectivty simply does not go this far.... and >>> part of this has to do with a poor understanding of objects. What is >>> worse is when this understanding infects interpersonal relationships >>> in the context of a Randian sort of world where there is "no such >>> thing as society, only individuals" (yet, bosses treat workers like >>> bikes and bad boyfriends treat their partners like robots). >>> >>> I am very excited to read more. I feel like it is important to free >>> our thinking from patterns and habits of the past. In particular, the >>> culture of academic citation has gone from being about finding good >>> ideas where they are to deriving authority from the aura of the great >>> figure. I also have no problem with accumulations of wisdom that >>> translate into an inherited perspective, but this can't close us off >>> to thinking. So.... thank you for this! >>> >>> Davin >>> >>> On Fri, Jun 15, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu> >>> wrote: >>>> Davin, >>>> >>>> I'm about to disappear into a mess of meetings, but let me offer a brief >>>> response: >>>> >>>> What you're touching on here is what Levi Byrant sometimes calls the "weird >>>> mereology" of OOO. The song isn't "just" the sound waves (what Harman calls >>>> an underming position) nor is it just the social context of creation and >>>> use >>>> (an overmining position). A song is a song, and indeed, the song in an MP3 >>>> file is a different thing than the song as an abstraction in human culture. >>>> Neither is more object nor more real (well, "real" has a different meaning >>>> for Harman than it does for Levi and me). >>>> >>>> I talk about this a bit in the first chapter of Alien Phenomenology, and >>>> Levi does as well in the mereology section of Democracy of Objects. Also, >>>> here are a blog post from Levi on the subject that weaves the two >>>> together: >>>> http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/08/12/more-strange-mereology/ >>>> >>>> I'm not answering sufficiently but wanted to get something out to you >>>> rapidly. >>>> >>>> ib >>>> >>>> Ian Bogost, Ph.D. >>>> Professor >>>> Director, Graduate Program in Digital Media >>>> >>>> Georgia Institute of Technology >>>> Digital Media/TSRB 320B >>>> 85 Fifth Street NW >>>> Atlanta, GA 30308-1030 >>>> >>>> ibog...@gatech.edu >>>> +1 (404) 894-1160 (tel) >>>> +1 (404) 894-2833 (fax) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jun 15, 2012, at 4:11 AM, davin heckman wrote: >>>> >>>> Ian, >>>> >>>> Since we are on the topic of OOO, I was wondering what the ontological >>>> status of something like a song is? I have to admit, I have a real >>>> hard time swallowing a pure ontology that essentially defines the >>>> subjective as outside of being, as a sort of on or off proposition, as >>>> opposed to also a turning on (or is it being turned on? Or simply to >>>> be turned or to turn?) (I am generally skeptical about a variety of >>>> posthumanisms that go beyond a critique of a monolithic Humanism, >>>> because I think that consciousness carries specific tendencies that >>>> seem to fundamentally frame all possibilities for knowledge). However >>>> it is entirely possible that I am missing out on a discussion that has >>>> been unfolding without me. >>>> >>>> But here's my thought: With a song, you have something that can be >>>> rendered in "objective" form.... maybe an mp3 file or a sheet of >>>> notes or record or something. If this is what we mean by a song, >>>> then, fine, that's an object. But a song only really starts doing >>>> something when it is unfolding within the context of memory and >>>> anticipation. It only is a song when it is listened to by a subject, >>>> which is to say it is an object that has a singular temporal being as >>>> it is listened to, which is distinct from how it is being listened to >>>> and replayed even by the same user. (And we aren't even beginning to >>>> talk about non-recorded music). The only way a song becomes a purely >>>> discrete object is when it is removed from its temporal existence and >>>> understood as a totality, and detached from an audience. And while we >>>> can sit around and all talk about, say, "Another One Bites the Dust," >>>> after we squeeze it into a conceptual file type and label it, the fact >>>> that we can discuss something that can only mean something if is >>>> experienced as a process AND an object within the context of a >>>> experience, suggests that sometimes being is realized by the relations >>>> of things, rather than the things themselves. My suggestion is that >>>> the ontological nature of the song cannot be described in objective >>>> terms without missing what a song is. Without the non-objective >>>> component of its being, a song is just sound. If we say, well, "Hey, >>>> when this sound occurs, people do X, Y, and Z," we can find ourself >>>> thinking that these effects are produced by the object, but this sort >>>> of thought experiment only gives us half an understanding of the >>>> object's being. You also have to think of that song in relation to >>>> the current context, to itself over time, to the individual and >>>> collective experience of its audience, to the culture, etc. Again, a >>>> great means to produce estrangement, but not the complete account of >>>> what the thing is. At the risk of sounding chauvinistic, I can see >>>> that it might be expedient to regard a distant moon without regard to >>>> its historical relationship to the human. It's useful to think of a >>>> distant moon as a quantity of data. But the closer we get to human >>>> existence, the more likely we are to encounter types of things that >>>> exist, but that cannot be understood properly as a bundle of discrete >>>> data. Maybe there are some texts that address precisly these sorts of >>>> concerns. >>>> >>>> This is where I think ontology cannot simply be objective. It must, >>>> of course, be able to establish the differences between things, to >>>> render those things it claims to understand in discrete form, insofar >>>> as they can be considered as such. On the other hand, we know that >>>> most of what the world is made of is common and that the laws of >>>> physics, for instance, harness discrete things under a kind of >>>> continuity. So, along with the conditions of radical difference that >>>> a philosophy of objects implies, there are the conditions of radical >>>> connectivity. Both features are equally present, which is to say they >>>> offer us little in the way of productive knowledge EXCEPT insofar as >>>> we can bind and sever, cut or tie, digitize or analogize within this >>>> framework of matter. The 21st century loves digitizing things..... >>>> it helps computers see the world, it helps them count us, predict our >>>> behavior, weigh it, value it, direct it, etc. But the digital is only >>>> half of our existence.... the analog process is equally present in >>>> language and cognition.... and it is just as equpped to help us >>>> understand the world by creating categories of things and identifying >>>> common qualities. In "Notes on the Uncanny," Freud identifies this >>>> struggle as productive of a kind of unsettling (the person that acts >>>> like an object/the object that acts like a person)... but it does not >>>> simply have to be a "scary" process.... the move from discrete to >>>> connected or from one into multiple can also be deeply satisfying and >>>> reassuring of being. If both processes are equally useful, then what >>>> presides over these two tendencies? Temporal consciousness that can >>>> mobilize processes of digitization and analogy? Another place to >>>> think through this is in relation to a variety of attempts at >>>> taxonomy. At some point, a poodle has to be a poodle and a wolf has >>>> to be a wolf, but in relation to squids, both can be canines. We >>>> could say that well, we are talking about layers of qualities that >>>> enable us to categorize this object or that object. But without the >>>> history of the poodle we don't really know how one canine can be a >>>> fashion accessory and the other is a part of a wild ecology, all of >>>> which (domesticating work dogs, turning tool animals into fashion >>>> animals, thinking about animals as people, killing wild animals, >>>> restoring wildness, etc) radically alter the parameters of being based >>>> on thoughts about being. To take it back to queer thought, around the >>>> bend of singular identities is the knowlege that such queerness does >>>> not preclude deep relationality. My reading is that the fruits of >>>> this thought are an affirmation of the idea that the well-worn paths >>>> of prescribed human behavior do not necessarily lead to earnest >>>> relationships, it is not to reject relationship itself in favor of >>>> individualism because capitalism has been doing this since the >>>> transformation of labor into commodity. >>>> >>>> Why does this matter? I care about politics, but I am not going to >>>> say that OOO cleaves to this or that kind of politics.... it doesn't >>>> matter. If a statement is discernibly true, then I have an obligation >>>> to bend my ideas around the true statement. And my sense, based on >>>> very limited reading, is that OOO is trying to figure out what we can >>>> know about being. So, while it is worth considering the political >>>> implications of speculative thought, I think Galloway is a bit wrong >>>> to suggest that something is "bourgeois" or something just because >>>> financial markets also offer a flat ontology via capital. The only >>>> thing that really matters is whether or not a philosophy can get us to >>>> a mutually agreed upon knowledge of the world that can be transmitted >>>> effectively from one context to another and continue to be useful. >>>> >>>> I have been lazy about following this month's discussion, but I like >>>> the idea of queering technology, of the productively broken tool. It >>>> is an area that has affinities with regards to my own reading of >>>> electronic literature..... taking Jakobson's discussion of poetics up >>>> through Darko Suvin's discussion of "cognitive estrangement," and >>>> looking at the ways that digital literary practices perform a similar >>>> process with regards to instrumental languages. My thought is that OOO >>>> is productive in that it asks us to engage in a thought experiment >>>> about pure objectivitiy, and in doing so, reveals the critical >>>> necessity of subjective and intersubjective aspects of human being >>>> that are embedded in our broader assertions about being. I think that >>>> a lot of the "posthumanisms" try to simply go beyond something that we >>>> have never understood in the first place: that being human is >>>> essentially a kind of queer existence, all the much more so when we >>>> insist that it is not. For my part, I want my human rights. So while >>>> I am sympathetic, generally, with many of the aims of the >>>> posthumanists I encounter, I generally think that "Humanism" has yet >>>> to adequately describe being human. Like Habermas said of modernity, >>>> it's daunting and messy and incomplete (like most things worth doing). >>>> Living in Norway right now (moving in a couple weeks, unfortunately), >>>> humanism seems to be working out pretty well here. The problems of >>>> the world do not stem from a love of humanity, they stem from our >>>> growing estrangment from humanity and increased clustering into >>>> paranoid, exclusionary enclaves (Why do you think everyone watches >>>> Zombie movies? Blasting away at legions of dirty anthropoidal morons >>>> trying to eat what you have, a perfect gospel for post democratic >>>> capitalism). In a world of Darwinian evolution, we are not entirely >>>> selected, we alter the landscape of an objective process through our >>>> dialogue with an objective sphere that exists, that we inhabit, and >>>> that we think about, but which does not simply constitute us. >>>> >>>> I admit these thoughts are poorly formed.... and I am very busy these >>>> days.... so I might not be able to reply as quickly as I would >>>> normally. But am very interested in these conversations. >>>> >>>> Davin >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jun 14, 2012 at 4:16 PM, frederic neyrat <fney...@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi, >>>> >>>> >>>> I would like - if possible - to get one or two examples about the >>>> >>>> objects concerned by your statement:"all objects equally exist, but >>>> >>>> not all objects exist equally." I guess - but I just guess - that the >>>> >>>> first part of the sentence is ontological and the second part could be >>>> >>>> political, but maybe I'm wrong. Thanks in advance. >>>> >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> >>>> Frederic Neyrat >>>> >>>> >>>> 2012/6/14 Ian Bogost <ian.bog...@lcc.gatech.edu>: >>>> >>>> Ok, sigh, let me try this again. >>>> >>>> >>>> The "as much as" is not a judgement of value, but of existence. This is the >>>> >>>> fundamental disagreement that played out in the comments to Galloway's work >>>> >>>> and in the many responses elsewhere. The world is big and contains many >>>> >>>> things. I've put this principle thusly: "all objects equally exist, but not >>>> >>>> all objects exist equally." >>>> >>>> >>>> It's possible that such a metaphysical position isn't for everyone. But if >>>> >>>> your idea of "being political" is as exclusionary and deprecatory as both >>>> >>>> Galloway's post and my limited experience thusfar here on empyre, then >>>> >>>> perhaps you can explain why that a model worth aspiring for? Why that is >>>> >>>> virtuous and righteous? >>>> >>>> >>>> Ian >>>> >>>> >>>> On Jun 14, 2012, at 2:57 PM, Rob Myers wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 06/14/2012 07:02 PM, Ian Bogost wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> As for queer and feminist formulations, I agree with the spirit of what >>>> >>>> >>>> you say, but I'll reiterate my observation that SR/OOO is moving in a >>>> >>>> >>>> slightly different direction—one that concerns toasters and quasars as >>>> >>>> >>>> much as human subjects (note the "as much as" here). Why not take this >>>> >>>> >>>> work for what it is, at least for starters, rather than for what it >>>> >>>> >>>> isn't? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The "as much as" is precisely the problem. >>>> >>>> >>>> Galloway's critique of OOO that Zach mentioned explains why: >>>> >>>> >>>> http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/06/03/a-response-to-graham-harmans-marginalia-on-radical-thinking/ >>>> >>>> >>>> But I wouldn't lump Meillassoux in with Harman. I think Meillassoux's >>>> >>>> philosophy can indeed be interesting for this debate because of its >>>> >>>> embracing of contingency and possibility. >>>> >>>> >>>> - Rob. >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> >>>> empyre forum >>>> >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> empyre forum >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> empyre forum >>>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >>> _______________________________________________ >>> empyre forum >>> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >>> http://www.subtle.net/empyre >> _______________________________________________ >> empyre forum >> empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au >> http://www.subtle.net/empyre > _______________________________________________ > empyre forum > empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au > http://www.subtle.net/empyre _______________________________________________ empyre forum empyre@lists.cofa.unsw.edu.au http://www.subtle.net/empyre
