Sam Hartman <hartmans-i...@mit.edu> 写于 2012-05-16 20:26:40:
> 
> The explicit structure of
> that paragraph was called out for WG review prior to IETF last call;
> also that structure was present in IETF last call.  I do not wish to
> wait to reach consensus on general comments about proes/cons of
> implementing channel binding with tunnel methods prior to approval of
> this document.

Well,no matter what's the result, I don't like the logic in the current 
text,
it is not clear and easy to confusing the two bindings. 

> Thus I prefer the current text.
> 
> Channel binding can happen before or after the MSK is generated, but
> effectively needs to happen after some key is generated.
> 
> I would expect that the key used for channel binding integrity would be
> cryptographically independent of the MSK.
> I've not analyzed a method where the MSK is used for channel binding but
> this is done prior to transport to the authenticator.
> That's probably safe, but it seems like a bad design strategy because it
> seems needlessly fragile.
> So, I'd be nervous about that strategy and would recommend independent
> keys for channel binding.

If there is another key available, it will be great, 
EMSK? It has been suggested for cryptographic binding.



> 
> I disagree.
> I'd ask you to take a look at the slides I presented at IETF 83. I think
> they are more clear than draft-hartman-emu-mutual-crypto-binding at the
> moment, although obviously we will update that draft in the near future
> to reflect your comments and those of others.

If EMSK is used in channel binding, is cryptophic binding using EMSK still 
neccesary?
> 
> That would be a change to existing EAP methods in some cases.
> That sort of change is out of scope for draft-ietf-emu-chbind.
> It's true that channel binding benefits from protected success
> indications and the current draft-ietf-emu-chbind does discuss that.

If EMSK is used, then no change to existing EAP methods will be made.
That will be fine.
 

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