Hello EMU,

I would like to address a question I could not answer during today's meeting.

Specifically, there was a question on the Chat from Alan about EAP-CREDS adoption in CBRS-A. My information is a bit outdated, but AFAIK there was no implementation (that I am aware of or publicly disclosed) when the specs were released and I am not sure what type is used. We need to progress EAP-CREDS to make sure implementations can be interoperable also outside the CBRS environment.

I would like to thank the Chairs for the opportunity to present at IETF 113 and we hope we can bring more details at the next meeting (spec and code).

One aspect that seemed quite common in some of the presentations and the work in EMU is that there seem to be few emerging needs that go beyond the original purpose of EAP: credentials bootstrapping (or provisioning) and credentials management.

The main difference between the two needs relies in the fact that usually bootstrapping leverages an identity to provision the "network credentials" based on the bootstrapping ones, while credentials management deals with the evolution of such credentials (i.e., updating passwords every x days, renewing certificates, etc.). From this point of view, we see EAP-CREDS as adding the "management" part on top of the provisioning part.

If we look at the proposal for leveraging DPP credentials to deliver PKCS#7 in TEAP from the EAP-CREDS angle, we can see how the two proposals work really well together: the DPP/bootstrapping allows the delivery of network-specific credentials, while EAP-CREDS allows network controllers to enforce security policies by, for example, implementing the [ PKCS#10/PKCS#7 ] TLVs negotiation built in EAP-TEAP as a tunneled mechanism of EAP-CREDS (thus allowing the use of the same provisioning protocol for bootstrapping and for subsequent management).

Looking forward to great conversations!

Have a wonderful day!

Cheers,
Max

--
Best Regards,
Massimiliano Pala, Ph.D.
OpenCA Labs Director
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