The IESG has received a request from the EAP Method Update WG (emu) to
consider the following document: - 'Forward Secrecy for the Extensible
Authentication Protocol Method for
   Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' FS)'
  <draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-10.txt> as Informational RFC

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits final
comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
last-c...@ietf.org mailing lists by 2023-03-13. Exceptionally, comments may
be sent to i...@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the beginning
of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


   Many different attacks have been reported as part of revelations
   associated with pervasive surveillance.  Some of the reported attacks
   involved compromising the smart card supply chain, such as attacking
   SIM card manufacturers and operators in an effort to compromise
   shared secrets stored on these cards.  Since the publication of those
   reports, manufacturing and provisioning processes have gained much
   scrutiny and have improved.  However, the danger of resourceful
   attackers for these systems is still a concern.  Always assuming
   breach such as key compromise and minimizing the impact of breach are
   essential zero-trust principles.

   This specification updates RFC 9048, the improved Extensible
   Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile Network Authentication
   and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA'), with an optional extension.  Similarly,
   this specification also updates the earlier version of the EAP-AKA'
   specification in RFC 5448.  The extension, when negotiated, provides
   Forward Secrecy for the session key generated as a part of the
   authentication run in EAP-AKA'.  This prevents an attacker who has
   gained access to the long-term pre-shared secret in a Subscriber
   Identity Module (SIM) card from being able to decrypt any past
   communications.  In addition, if the attacker stays merely a passive
   eavesdropper, the extension prevents attacks against future sessions.
   This forces attackers to use active attacks instead.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs/


The following IPR Declarations may be related to this I-D:

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3097/
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/3098/






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