Djoni yth,
Saya mendukung ide anda untuk mengusulkan kepada pemerintah tindakan
preventif agar ancaman bahaya dari kemungkinan kebocoran dan radiasi bahan
toksik tersebut. Mungkin yang tahu informasi ini adalah dari Dep.
Perhubungan atau AL.
manan
file aslinya, tapi isinya
>tidak berubah.
>
>---------------------------------------------------------------------
>From: Self <ysumarla>
>Subject: Plutonium Shipment
>Date: Wed, 14 Jul 1999 14:50:34
>
>
>Dear All
>
>Following is the information about the shipment of weapon-usable
>Plutonium from France to Japan. The first information (4pagebrf.mox)
>is the short briefing about the shipment. Covered in this briefing are
>three important concerns about the shipment: the secrecy of the
>shipment route, inadequate security arrangement for the shipment, and
>possible misuse of the plutonium for military purposes.
>
>The second information (LettertogovtJune.doc) is the letter for the
>governments to remind them about the probable danger of the plutonium
>shipment. The third (TsurugaPlantAccident03.doc) is the news about the
>latest nuclear plant accident in Tsuruga Plant, Japan. The fourth
>(MOXSendingConfirmed.doc) is the confirmation of the plutonium
>shipment from La Hague, France. The fifth is the news from Asahi
>Shimbun about the planned meeting between Korean and Japan government
>about the shipment route. The last (KoreanEnquireJaps.doc) is Asahi
>Shimbuns news about Korean's government meeting with the Japan
>government about the shipment.
>
>The reasons for sending this information are:
>1. Asia countries territory are located in the possible route of the
>shipment. National NGOs must remind the governments to take action
>against the shipment.
>2. In case of accident, there is no arrangement made by the company to
>compensate the possible hazard to the country or people where the
>accident takes place. National NGOs must urge the government to press
>the company to arrange compensation in case of nuclear accident along
>the shipment route.
>3. If the governments show indifferent reaction to the call, it is a
>work of national NGOs to press the shipping company to cancel the
>shipment, both for environmental reasons or security reasons.
>4. National NGOs should press their governments to demand the
>governments of France, England, and Japan to disclose a plan for
>security arrangement for the shipment and the load in the shipment.
>5. In case that the shipment breaches the particular countrys
>national law about shipment of dangerous materials from, through, or
>to the country, national NGOs should demand the government to apply
>the law in order to uphold national sovereign in its territory.
>
>You can the first information to start an action and the second one to
>call attention of your respective governments over the dangerous
>plutonium shipment. The third information is important to support the
>fact that the Japanese nuclear program is unreliable to process the
>plutonium. While the fourth information is necessary to confirm the
>shipment to the governments, the last information shows the
>seriousness of the issue that Korean government has taken measures to
>anticipate it.
>
>------------------------------
>
>STOP PLUTONIUM
>GREENPEACE
>
>Secret Shipment of Nuclear Bomb Material From Europe to Japan
>July 1999
>
>OVER the next few weeks, two ships carrying a secret cargo of
>dangerous, nuclear weapons-usable plutonium fuel will leave ports in
>Britain and France and sail around the globe to Japan. On board will
>be fuel containing more plutonium than in the entire Indian and
>Pakistani nuclear weapons programmes.(1)
>
>The two British flagged vessels, the Pacific Teal and the Pacific
>Pintail, will leave Barrow in Britain and Cherbourg in France carrying
>the first commercial shipment to Japan of mixed-oxide (MOX) reactor
>fuel, made from plutonium and uranium. An estimated 446 kilograms of
>plutonium is contained in the 40 nuclear fuel elements enough
>fissile material to construct 60 nuclear bombs. The International
>Atomic Energy Agency classifies this plutonium fuel as a "category
>one" "direct use" weapons material, and estimates it would take just
>1-3 weeks to convert into nuclear bombs.
>
>The shipments mark a new and dangerous phase of the nuclear industry;
>the plan to expand the use of plutonium fuel (MOX) in conventional
>nuclear reactors in Japan and around the world. These reactors were
>not designed to burn plutonium fuel and its use will significantly
>reduce safety margins. Plants in the United Kingdom and France are set
>to massively expand production of MOX fuel if Japan signs contracts
>based on a successful transport this year.
>
>If the shipments are successful and MOX fabrication expands, then the
>international community faces 80 more such shipments over the next ten
>years, the spread of nuclear weapons material more widely than ever
>before, and raised tensions in one of the most politically volatile
>regions of the world Asia. Public health and the environment will be
>put at increased risk from radioactive pollution and nuclear
>accidents, as reactors burn a fuel they were not designed to handle.
>As plutonium is highly radio-toxic, the shipments will also pose a
>danger to countries en route. While the probability of a transport
>accident may be low, the consequences for the environment and public
>health could be devastating.
>
>
>ROUTE OF PLUTONIUM FUEL (MOX) SHIPMENT KEPT SECRET
>
>THE plutonium (MOX) fuel shipment is being conducted for the Japanese
>electrical utilities Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and Kansai
>Electric Power Company (KEPCO) by Britain and France. The plutonium
>has been produced from the reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel at two
>sites in Europe: Sellafield in northern England, operated by British
>Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), and La Hague in North France, operated by
>COGEMA. These two sites are the largest producers of plutonium on the
>planet. Combined, the sites have in storage more than 100 tonnes of
>plutonium -- more than is in the US nuclear weapons stockpile. The
>contracts for the production of the plutonium fuel were signed on
>behalf of the Japanese utilities by Mitsubishi and Toshiba. Plutonium
>fuel for TEPCO has been produced at Dessel in Belgium and transported
>by road to La Hague prior to sea shipment to Japan, where it will be
>loaded in the Fukushima nuclear power plant. The plutonium fuel for
>Kansai has been produced at Sellafield and will be shipped directly to
>Japan for loading at the Takahama nuclear power plant. These pilot
>contracts are intended to test the technical and logistical
>feasibility of a MOX fuel cycle extending from Japan to France,
>Britain and Belgium.
>
>The route the shipment will take remains a closely guarded secret by
>Japanese, French and British authorities and the operating companies.
>The nations along the various potential routes have not been informed
>nor asked for their permission for the shipment to travel through
>their regions. Given that more than fifty countries around the globe
>protested earlier Japanese plutonium and nuclear waste shipments,
>the transporting countries have a strong interest in keeping the
>enroute nations uninformed.
>
>Based on previous transports of high level nuclear waste from Europe
>to Japan and a shipment of plutonium in 1992, the imminent plutonium
>fuel shipments can be expected to take one of the following three
>routes from Europe to Japan:
>
>* south along the west coast of Africa, around the Cape of Good Hope,
>across the Indian Ocean and north through the Tasman Sea and South
>Pacific (the route of the 1992 Akatsuki Maru plutonium shipment)
>
>* west across the Atlantic Ocean, through the Mona Passage, across the
>Caribbean Sea, through the Panama Canal and across the Pacific (this
>was the route of high level nuclear waste shipments of 1998 and 1999)
>
>* southwest across the Atlantic, along the east coast of Latin
>America, around Cape Horn and northwest across the Pacific (this was
>the route of the first high level nuclear waste in 1995)
>
>Assuming that the two and a half month voyage is made without mishap,
>the two freighters will enter Japanese waters and unload their
>plutonium cargoes in the private harbours which service the Fukushima
>and Takahama reactors.
>
>
>INADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VESSELS
>
>THE two freighters carrying the plutonium fuel, the "Pacific Pintail"
>and the "Pacific Teal", are both operated by Pacific Nuclear Transport
>Limited (PNTL), which is owned by BNFL, COGEMA and the Japan
>Federation of Electrical Power Companies. Because international
>regulations require military security arrangements for cargoes of
>nuclear bomb-usable material, the ships will be armed with 30 mm
>cannons and carry armed UK Atomic Energy Agency police, which normally
>guard British nuclear weapons facilities.
>
>A previous shipment of plutonium from Europe to Japan in 1992 was
>accompanied by a Japanese naval escort that included a warship loaded
>with commando boats, machine guns and helicopters. However, because
>the nuclear industry wants to cut costs and portray the upcoming
>shipment as a routine commercial transport rather than a proliferation
>threat, the two civilian vessels will act as an escort for each other.
>This arrangement is clearly inadequate to deter any determined
>physical attack and in fact creates more hazards by storing ammunition
>and explosives together with large quantities of fuel oil and
>plutonium on the same vessel.
>
>A 1988 US Department of Defense threat assessment report on plutonium
>shipments concluded that in order to "adequately deter theft or
>sabotage, it would be necessary to provide a dedicated surface
>combatant to escort the vessel throughout the trip". Even with an
>escort "no one could guarantee the safety of the cargo from a security
>incident, such as an attack on the vessel by small, fast craft,
>especially if armed with modern anti-ship missiles."
>
>The United States has a legal responsibility for the security of the
>plutonium fuel shipments to Japan as it originated from US enriched
>uranium and is therefore covered by US rules of origin. This means
>that plans for the transport of MOX fuel from Europe to Japan must
>comply with specific US requirements concerning safety and physical
>protection. These are set out in the 1988 US-Japan agreement on
>nuclear co-operation and include the requirement either that the
>transport ship should be accompanied by an armed escort vessel or that
>alternative security measures acceptable to the US should be in
>place.
>
>In February this year the Chairman of the US House of Representatives
>International Relations Committee, Benjamin Gilman, expressed his
>concern that the transportation plan does not meet, or is not
>equivalent, to the physical protection measures specified in the 1988
>Japan-U.S. agreement. In a letter to Secretary of State Madeleine
>Albright (11th Feb 1999), Gilman said:
>
>"In my view, escort vessels which are minimally armed and have a top
>speed of 13 knots, would not appear to have sufficient defensive and
>deterrent ability, much less the manoeuvrability or speed of military
>or coast guard escort ships. With regard to armaments, I would expect
>that any proposed escort vessel would include a radar-directed,
>anti-missile defence system.
>"At a minimum, the measures applied to the 1992 shipment of separated
>plutonium should be used for this MOX shipment, including the use of
>an armed escort vessel for the entire voyage."
>
>Despite these concerns the U.S. State Department has approved the
>present security arrangements, raising questions about the Clinton
>Administration's commitment to applying an effective and consistent
>nuclear non-proliferation policy.
>
>
>PLUTONIUM THE BASIC INGREDIENT OF A NUCLEAR BOMB
>
>PLUTONIUM is a highly radio-toxic element, all but non-existent in
>nature, which is produced in nuclear reactors. Inhalation of a single
>microgram, smaller than a speck of dust, can cause fatal lung cancer.
>Plutonium is the most highly prized fuel --or fissionable material--
>for making nuclear weapons, and has been an essential fuel driving
>the nuclear arms race over the last half century. Given its long
>half-life, some 24,000 years, once produced, plutonium remains a
>deadly environmental contaminant and a potential fuel for nuclear
>weapons.
>
>Plutonium is produced as a nuclear reactors uranium fuel becomes
>irradiated -- bombarded by neutrons -- some of the uranium is changed
>into plutonium and remains contained in the irradiated or spent
>nuclear fuel. In the case of "military production reactors" this
>process of plutonium production is maximised, but all conventional
>nuclear power reactors produce plutonium.
>
>In order to access this plutonium for nuclear weapons purposes, the
>nuclear weapons states developed a very dirty and dangerous chemical
>separation technology known as "reprocessing". Through this process,
>the spent fuel is chopped up, chemically dissolved and the plutonium
>is separated out of the resulting stew of highly radioactive,
>long-lived nuclear waste. This process involves massive routine
>discharges of radioactivity to the air and sea, tremendous risks of
>explosions, radioactive releases, and worker exposure. The two major
>reprocessing plants in the world are located at Sellafield in the
>United Kingdom and La Hague in France.
>
>The nuclear industry's original plan was to use plutonium in "fast
>breeder reactors" which would breed, or generate, more plutonium than
>they used. With the technical and economic collapse of these breeder
>reactors world-wide, the plutonium reprocessing industry faced a dead
>end. So the industry is now proposing burning plutonium mixed with
>uranium (MOX) in conventional, light water reactors.
>
>The nuclear industry claims that extracting plutonium from the MOX
>fuel is a technically complicated process that thus reduces the risk
>of its diversion into nuclear weapons programmes, or the risk of
>seizure by terrorists. However in reality MOX fuel can be handled with
>little difficulty and plutonium can be extracted in any reasonably
>well-equipped laboratory using standard chemical processes. Dr Frank
>Barnaby, a nuclear physicist who worked at the UK's Nuclear Weapons
>Establishment at Aldermaston between 1951 and 57, says: "If a
>terrorist group acquired MOX fuel, it could relatively easily
>chemically separate the plutonium and fabricate a nuclear explosive".
>The U.S. Department of Energys Office of Arms Control and
>Non-Proliferation also acknowledged this point in a 1997 report:
>"Nevertheless, it is important to understand that fresh MOX fuel
>remains a material in the most sensitive category because plutonium
>suitable for use in weapons could be separated from it relatively
>easily".
>
>
>A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT THAT CAN'T HAPPEN?
>
>ALTHOUGH an accident involving the release of even a small fraction of
>the plutonium contained in one of these shipments could have
>devastating results for the environment and public health, safety
>considerations have been seriously jeopardised by cost-cutting and
>secrecy. Inadequate design, testing and construction of the transport
>containers, insufficient emergency planning, and inadequate liability
>coverage suggest that the industry and governments involved are simply
>unwilling to pay the cost of making anything but their profits safe.
>
>The plutonium fuel is to be carried in type-B nuclear transport flasks
>that were designed to carry spent fuel. Under IAEA regulations such
>flasks are designed to withstand a drop of nine meters on to an
>unyielding surface (13 metres/second), being engulfed in fire at 800
>degrees C for 30 minutes, and immersion at a depth of 15 metres for
>eight hours. Transports can be by road, rail, sea or air.
>
>Regardless of the transport mode, the design specifications of the
>flask can be easily exceeded. For example, a fire raged aboard the
>ferry Moby Prince for over 45 hours and exceeded 1,000 degrees C after
>it collided with an oil petroleum tanker, the Agip Abrozzo, off the
>Italian port of Livorno in 1991. According to the International
>Maritime Organisation (IMO), on average, shipboard fires burn for 23
>hours at sea and 20 hours in port, while the US Department of Energy
>admits that petroleum fires can exceed 1,000 degrees C.
>
>Under existing liability agreements, there is no certainty that
>compensation would be paid to enroute states in the event of an
>accident. At best, international conventions and other arrangements
>may provide some compensation, but no assurances exist whatsoever that
>the full costs of health, environmental and economic damages would be
>paid to victims enroute states.
>
>
>CONCLUSION
>
>UNLESS international controversy puts a stop to future shipments of
>plutonium fuel around the world, a new and deadly phase in the nuclear
>cycle will be established. The proposal to burn plutonium (MOX) fuel
>in conventional reactors -- a proposal intended to justify the
>survival of the plutonium programmes of Britain, France and Japan --
>threatens to create dangerous nuclear proliferation and environmental
>risks. The shipments therefore undermine international
>non-proliferation objectives and put the health and security of
>millions of people in danger. The only way forward is to stop the
>reprocessing of plutonium and cancel plans for the use of MOX fuel in
>nuclear reactors globally. Unless this occurs, growing stockpiles of
>"civil" plutonium will soon rival military stockpiles, and
>international attempts to agree an effective and verifiable ban on the
>production and use of plutonium and other fissile materials will be
>fatally undermined.
>
>
>
>
>(1) The current plutonium stockpile of India is estimated to be 350kg
>and the plutonium-equivalent of Pakistans stockpile, 67.2kg, giving a
>total of 417kg, according to a 1999 report by David Albright of the
>Institute for Science and International Security, based in Washington
>D.C. Albright was a member of the United Nations weapons inspection
>team in Iraq.
>
>
>For more information contact: Greenpeace International Nuclear
>Campaign +31 20 523 6222 or the Greenpeace International Press desk
>+31 20 524 9547/46
>Greenpeace on the web: www.greenpeace.org
>
>
>------------------------------
>
>[Title, Name]
>[Position]
>[Government Department]
>[Address 1]
>[Address 2]
>
>
> X June 1999
>
>
>[Greeting],
>
>I am writing to alert your government to clandestine shipments of
>Japanese plutonium fuel from Europe to Japan which are expected
>shortly. These shipments of nuclear weapons-usable material may pose a
>significant safety and security threat to your country.
>
>According to information compiled by Greenpeace, two armed vessels
>will leave Britain and France as early as mid-July, loaded with the
>first ever commercial scale shipments of mixed plutonium/uranium oxide
>(MOX) fuel. The "Pacific Teal" and the "Pacific Pintail", two nuclear
>freighters operated by Pacific Nuclear Transport Ltd (UK), will load
>their cargo in the French port of Cherbourg and the British port of
>Barrow-in-Furness and are due to leave for Japan between mid-July and
>September.
>
>The plutonium fuel involved in these shipments is classified by the
>International Atomic Energy Agency as a "category 1", direct-use
>nuclear weapons material. It can readily and swiftly be converted into
>a form which can be used in nuclear bombs. The two ships will carry
>some 40 fuel assemblies containing an estimated 450 kilograms of
>plutonium -- sufficient plutonium to construct up to 50 nuclear bombs.
>The transports thus raise serious security and proliferation concerns.
>
>Moreover, plutonium is an extremely radiotoxic material. If inhaled
>into the human lung, a tiny amount can cause fatal lung cancer. In
>the event of an accident, release of even a fraction of the plutonium
>fuel could pose significant risks to the environment and public
>health. In Greenpeace's view, these transports pose an unjustifiable
>risk to global security and to human health and the environment.
>
>The Japanese, French and British governments responsible for these
>shipments have chosen not to involve en route states in prior
>consultation on the route, or on emergency or salvage planning. No
>assurances have been given relating to emergency response, damage
>mitigation or liability for any damage caused. While the Japanese
>government is not revealing which way these transports will go, your
>country lies along one of the possible transport routes. Accordingly,
>we believe that your government needs to be aware of and take action
>against these dangerous shipments and the industry that drives them.
>
>You may recall that in 1992, the Akatsuki Maru made the first pilot
>shipment of plutonium from Europe to Japan, arousing enormous
>international controversy. In the face of protests from more than 50
>governments, Japan announced that it would temporarily suspend such
>shipments. However, Japan, which currently holds contracts to separate
>some 40 tonnes of plutonium at reprocessing plants in France and
>Britain, has now moved to resume these shipments, in the form of
>fabricated plutonium fuel. Accordingly, if this year's shipments go
>ahead, they will therefore be the first of dozens of such shipments
>over the next decade. They could also have the effect of launching a
>rapid expansion in the use of MOX fuel in conventional nuclear
>reactors in other countries -- a development with global proliferation
>implications.
>
>In 1992, the plutonium shipment was made via the Cape of Good Hope,
>the Indian Ocean, Tasman Sea and the South Pacific. Subsequently,
>four controversial high level nuclear waste shipments -- the waste
>product of the same plutonium reprocessing process that is responsible
>for producing the MOX fuel -- have been made along three different
>routes from France to Japan: through the Caribbean Sea and Panama
>Canal; around Latin America/Cape Horn and across the Pacific; and
>along eastern Africa, around the Cape of Good Hope, across the Indian
>Ocean and up through the Tasman Sea and South Pacific.
>
>A primary reason for the use of these different routes was that
>British, French and Japanese officials hoped to find a "path of least
>resistance". Instead, they have been faced with protests and
>declarations from dozens of en route countries condemning these
>extremely hazardous shipments. With this double shipment of plutonium
>fuel, they once again intend to test one of these routes.
>
>Greenpeace strongly encourages your Government to consider taking the
>following steps at national, regional and international level to stop
>these shipments:
>
>* Express your government's opposition to the upcoming transport of
>plutonium fuel publicly and to the Japanese, British and French
>governments at the highest level;
>
>* Urge the immediate cessation of transports at least until a
>comprehensive environmental impact assessment has been conducted and
>an arrangement requiring prior informed consent has been established
>as to the timing, route and nature of any such transports through your
>region;
>
>* Consider the development of legislation excluding such shipments
>from waters under your country's jurisdiction;
>
>* Work with other countries in your region to enact regional
>instruments prohibiting such shipments through the region's waters or
>requiring prior informed consent, environmental impact assessments and
>full responsibility for liability for any damage caused to be
>undertaken by those undertaking the shipments;
>
>* Engage with the Conference on Disarmament's on-going negotiations on
>fissile materials to ensure that a treaty be concluded that provides
>for a comprehensive ban on all plutonium separation and use for any
>purpose, in order to ensure a truly effective and verifiable
>non-proliferation regime.
>
> Please find further information enclosed which backgrounds the status
>of Japan's plutonium programme and the proliferation and environmental
>risks it raises. If your government does take action on this issue,
>we would very much appreciate receiving any information about the
>steps which you have taken.
>
> Yours sincerely
>
>
>
> Thilo Bode
> Executive Director
> Greenpeace International
>
>
>
> Annex 1: Japan's Plutonium Programme.
>
> The plutonium fuel (MOX) transports scheduled in the next few months
>are driven by Japan's plutonium program. Under this program, Japan
>exports spent nuclear fuel from its nuclear power reactors to France
>and Britain where this nuclear waste is "reprocessed". Reprocessing
>involves a chemical process to separate the plutonium from the spent
>fuel, leaving contaminated uranium and a tremendous volume of nuclear
>waste.
>
> While the exact terms of the contracts agreed between Japanese
>utilities and the European reprocessing companies is kept secret, it
>is believed that they require this plutonium, uranium and nuclear
>waste to be shipped back from France and Britain to Japan. Some of
>these return shipments have already occurred from France to Japan in
>the last few years:
>
>* the 1992 plutonium oxide transport on the Akatsuki Maru which
>sailed to Japan via the Cape of Good Hope, Indian Ocean, Tasman Sea
>and the South Pacific
>* the 1995 high level nuclear waste (HLW) transport on the "Pacific
> Pintail" which sailed to Japan via the East coast of South America,
>Cape Horn and the South Pacific
>* the 1997 transport of HLW on the Pacific Teal which sailed to
>Japan via the Cape of Good Hope, the Indian Ocean, Tasman Sea, and
>South Pacific
>* the 1998 transport of HLW on the Pacific Swan which sailed to
>Japan via the Caribbean Sea and Panama Canal
>* the 1999 transport of HLW on the "Pacific Swan" which sailed to
>Japan via the Caribbean Sea and Panama Canal
>
>The Japanese government and industry committed to the plutonium
>program in the 1970s when it signed "reprocessing" contracts with the
>state-controlled plutonium companies British Nuclear Fuels (UK) and
>COGEMA (France). Japan committed to these expensive contracts because
>it intended to develop a new type of reactor--the Fast Breeder
>Reactor--which would be plutonium fuelled and was supposed to generate
>electricity while producing more plutonium than was started with.
>Instead, Japan has failed to construct a single commercial breeder
>reactor. In fact, the Monju breeder reactor which the Japanese
>government opened in April of 1994, and which they said would prove
>the commercial viability of such reactors, is now indefinitely
>shut-down after it was the site of the worst nuclear reactor accident
>in Japanese history in December 1995.
>
>Despite statements of the Japanese government and industry about
>plutonium guaranteeing Japan's energy future, no electricity is
>currently produced in Japan from plutonium produced after
>reprocessing. Instead, more than five tonnes of plutonium, including
>the material aboard the Akatsuki Maru, are now stockpiled in Japan.
>
>The Japanese government and industry are now scrambling to justify the
>plutonium programme. Japan is now suggesting that some of the
>plutonium can be mixed with uranium (MOX) and used in conventional
>nuclear reactors. Given that these reactors were designed to use
>uranium fuel alone, use of plutonium fuel will raise significant
>additional safety risks for reactor operation, severe reactor
>accidents and for the storage of nuclear waste. Plutonium fuel is
>also estimated to be up to ten times more expensive than conventional
>low enriched uranium fuel. The use of such weapons usable plutonium
>fuel also raises significant security and proliferation risks at the
>fuel fabrication, reactor, and waste storage facilities, and during
>the transports linking these facilities.
>
>The current shipment has been negotiated by Mitsubishi, Toshiba and
>the Japanese power utilities TEPCO and KEPCO, and the plutonium fuel
>is destined to be loaded in two conventional nuclear reactors at
>Fukushima and Takahama.
>
>Finally, despite the fact that Japan says it wants to get rid of the
>weapons-usable plutonium stockpile is has been amassing, it continues
>to have more plutonium separated in Europe and Japan and is
>considering signing new contracts for plutonium separation for the
>decades to come. Such plutonium programmes have signficant
>implications for the international community's efforts to ban the
>production and use of fissile material. Current discussions are
>focused solely on the production of plutonium and highly enriched
>uranium for so-called "military purposes". However, the wide-scale
>production of plutonium and MOX fuel for commercial use would
>seriously jeopardise the effective verification and implementation of
>a fissile material ban.
>
>
>Annex 2: The Transport Plan
>
>As has been the case with past spent fuel, plutonium and nuclear waste
>shipments, the Japanese, French and British governments are currently
>with-holding essential information about their transport plans. No
>information is being provided on the transport route to be taken,
>preparation of emergency and salvage plans or on outstanding safety,
>security and liability issues. Nor have the governments sought to
>consult with and get the approval for these plans from en route
>nations.
>
>In addition, despite repeated requests, the Japanese government has
>been unwilling to conduct an international Environmental Impact
>Assessment of the forthcoming plutonium shipments as required under
>customary international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the
>Sea (articles 204, 205, 206).
>
>Because the plutonium fuel is weapons-usable, it must be transported
>under military security. However, the two vessels have been armed
>only with light guns and water cannons -- in contrast to the 1992
>Akatsuki Maru shipment of separated plutonium oxide, which had an
>armed naval escort. The "civil" nuclear freighters will have 30mm
>cannons and armed security guards on board, and will escort each
>other. The shipping nations appear to want to save costs and give the
>appearance that this shipment is somehow a routine commercial cargo.
>In spite of these wholly inadequate security arrangements, the United
>States -- which must sign off on the security arrangements for the
>transport because the plutonium fuel is derived from US-origin uranium
>-- has approved the transport plan.
>
>The arming of the vessels creates an additional risk of accident,
>however, as each freighter will carry an estimated seven tons of
>highly explosive ammunition -- alongside an estimated 1,100 long tons
>of fuel oil. In addition, Japanese officials have revealed that
>instead of using new and purpose-constructed transport containers for
>these plutonium fuel transports they will instead use old, used spent
>fuel casks whose licenses have lapsed and whose operational history is
>unclear.
>
>The Pacific Pintail and Pacific Teal are currently at Barrow docks in
>Cumbria, Britain, where they are awaiting sea trials before making the
>journey to Japan. Information received by Greenpeace suggests that the
>shipments could be made from Barrow and Cherbourg anytime between
>mid-July and October. The transit would take approximately six
>weeks.
>
>The MOX fuel from the La Hague reprocessing plant, which has been
>fabricated at a Belgian facility in Dessel, is currently due to be
>transported from Belgium to France. Greenpeace drew public attention
>to the inadequate safety and security arrangements around the first of
>the MOX shipments from Belgium to France in May 1999, and the shipment
>was subsequently delayed due to apparent French and Belgian political
>concerns.
>
>-------------------
>
>From: "Shaun Burnie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Organization: Greenpeace
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Date sent: Tue, 13 Jul 1999 00:14:38 mez-1
>Subject: first part of la hague transport underway
>Copies to: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED],
> [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>Dear All,
>
>To confirm that the first transport of MOX fuel from la hague has
>left the plant and is moving to the railway yard at Armanville, near
>Valognes.
>
>The transport convoy appears to be 2 TN-17 casks - that means half of
>the plutonium 110kg, in 16 assemblies. Police escort, though no
>details.
>
>Departure from la hague is estimated at 10.30pm local time.
>
>First transport Valognes arrived 11.55 local time the convoy
>consisted of an estimated:
>
>ten police vans
>two police cars
>two exceptional convoy vehicles,
>8 security vans
>two buses full of police
>and security vans/buses - several
>and the three trucks of MOX
>
>GP video and still documented the arrival.
>
>Thats it for the moment - regards - Cherbourg Team.
>
>
>--Message-Boundary-10481
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>Content-description: Text from file 'TsurugaPlantAccident03.txt'
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT
>
>From: "Media Japan" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Organization: Greenpeace
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Date sent: Mon, 12 Jul 1999 18:12:27 +0000
>Subject: another nuclear accident in Japan
>
>Dear all,
>
>There was nuclear accident again in Japan, 6:05 am on 12th
>July(Japanese time). 6:48am the plant was shut down manually.
>According to Kyodo wire service 60tons of coolant water leaked,
>(13:25) but leaking is still going on. According Reuters (18:20),
>it has already more than 70tons.
>
>(According to Kyodo)
> leaking is 9.8tons per hour and when the pressure
>of nuclear plant is going down, it will stop leaking.
>JAPC will go to the accident site, check the leaking point and
>cause of the accident when the nuclear plant gets cool down.
>JAPC said there is no radioactive impact in the environment.
>
>
>I added Reuters news story as below for your information.
>
>Reuters 17:29
>Japan Atomic Power Company said on Monday it had manually shut down
>the NO.2 reactor at its Tsuruga nuclear power station due to a leak
>of primary coolant water.
>The reactor had leaked 46 tonnes of water as of 1:00 pm and still
>appeared to be leaking at a rate of about four tonnes an hour, a
>sopkeswoman for the company said.
>The spokeswoman said cooling facilities at the 1.16gigawatt reactor
>in Fukui prefecture on the Sea of Japan coast were being refilled to
>the normal capacity of about 260tonnes.
>The reactor was shut down following fire alarms and anomalies in
>monitor indications at 6:48 am.
>The ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) said accidnet
>was rated 1 on the international Nuclear Event Scle (INES). A rating
>of 1 is the third-lowest, following "out of scle" and 0, while 7 is
>the most serious rating.
>Japan Atomic Power said there was no radioactive impact on the
>environment.
>A MITI official said Japan's worst leak of primary coolant water,
>which was radiated , was in 1979 when Kansai Electic Power Co Inc's
>Takahama No.2 reactor leaked about 95tonnes.
>There was also a leak about 55 tonnes of primary coolant water in
>1991 at Kansai Electric's Mihama No.2 rector in 1991, the offical
>added.
>Althrough the Mihama leak was contained within water pipes, in the
>incidents at Tsuruga on Monday and at Takahama in 1979 primary
>coolant water leaked out of the water circulation system onto the
>container floor, the MITI official said.
>The Japan Atomic Power spokeswoman said it would be Monday evening
>before personnel could actually enter the site for further
>investigation.
>
>
>end
>
>noriko
>
>
>Noriko Oyama
>Press Officer
>Greenpeace Japan
>phone: 81 3 5351 5409
>fax : 81 3 5351 5417
>mobile:81 90 3470 7884
>e-mail:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>
>--Message-Boundary-10481
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>Content-description: Text from file 'KoreanEnquiresJaps.txt'
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT
>
>From: "Shaun Burnie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Organization: Greenpeace
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Date sent: Tue, 13 Jul 1999 16:02:35 mez-1
>Subject: korean government meeting with Japan on pu shipment
>
>Dear all,
>
>It has been reported in an article in todays Asahi Shimbun (pg3 in
>Kansai region) that the Korean government is preparing to ask
>officially the Japanese government for information about the
>upcoming shipment of MOX. It says that yesterday the Korean Ministry
>of Trade and Foreign Affairs announced that they will officially ask
>Japan about the route and for other information about the transport
>at the Japan Korean Environment Common Committee
>
>Meetings are to be held in Tokyo from the 15th of this month. The
>meetings are scheduled to last for two days.
>
>We will see what we can do to effect this meeting in advance
>
>best regards - shaun
>
>
>--Message-Boundary-10481--
>
>
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>D j o n i F e r d i w i j a y a
>Yayasan Gemi Nastiti [ G E N I ]
>Jln. Cemara II/25, P.O. Box 166
>Salatiga 50711, I N D O N E S I A
>phone / fax: +62 - 298 - 22418
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>
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