All,
Following up on my post of 9/24/09 at 16:06:
1. The holes: I believe the "Unauthorized" holes of concern to be
pretty much as those described in my FAA comments thusly:
"Per production drawing F53180 (Rev. B dated 6/10/60), the Forney F-1A
bucket seats are secured at the front by one left and right hook mounts
of similar construction.
Centerlines of these hooks are 4.437" outboard of the aircraft
centerline and then 10" further outboard on each side. Each such hook
is mounted to the main spar by four 8-32 fasteners. Installation
required a total of sixteen 11/65" (.171) holes to be drilled through
the spar cap. These are drilled in pairs, aligned fore and aft, at
eight locations. Per production drawing F53189 L/R (Rev. A dated
2/4/60) the fore-aft separation is .875". Per production drawing
F53190 L/R (Rev. A dated 2/4/60) the port-starboard separation is
1.468".
Holes drilled in the main spar for the forward attachment of bucket
seats installed in later production Forney, Alon and M10 (TCDS 787)
airframes may or may not be identical in number, size and location
between manufacturers. Please research and advise as to any
variations, considering this request my IR#17. The production change
to bucket seats received appropriate FAA review, was timely approved
almost fifty years ago, and has proven safe in extended service, and
has been approved as a retrofit in earlier airframes by approved 337.
Accordingly, there should be a strong presumption that any associated
reduction in spar strength resulting from the drilling or presence of
such holes is of no overall structural significance."
2. Univair: Per Mike Wotovitch, Univair has been in contact with the
FAA Denver Aircraft Certification Office regarding this ACS. Comments
were submitted about a week and a half ago, and they have requested a
"sit-down meeting" before the comment period on this ACS expires on
October 7th. I understand that they generally agree that the FAA is
presently pursuing an unproductive course as to the likely cause of the
Sebring crash and an effective response, and they do take this ACS
seriously.
3. EOC: I have heard indirectly that John Wright, Sr., A&P, IA and
EOC Technical Representative, has been working with Univair for some
time on the issue; and is of the opinion that excess aileron play was
the cause. Skip and I have talked at some length and he is personally
preparing a response. On Friday I mailed him photocopies of my
(revised) personal comments to the FAA and full text copies of
documents I referenced therein.
I emailed an information package to Marv. Dunlap, who has been working
with the FAA for years to get the ERCO Four into the air, and also to
several Tech members who have unique and prestigious qualifications for
further in-depth evaluation of this ACS, etc. My (revised) personal
comments went out Friday to the FAA via U.S.P.S. Certified Mail, Return
Receipt Requested with full text copies of documents referenced
therein.
Regards,
WRB
--
On Sep 22, 2009, at 13:53, Mike Willis wrote:
Does anyone know the answers to these questions please?
1 Do we know yet which holes are of concern?
2 What actions and response are Univair preparing?
3 What actions and response are Skip and the EOC preparing?
I’m assuming the FAA will take more note of 2 and 3 than individuals.
Thanks,
Mike
