> >> From a mystic standpoint, this can't be. To know > > something is closer to the analogy of a subscriber > > line. When one *knows* something, anything, they > > subscribe this pattern. > > Correct me if I'm wrong, but the usual definition of > knowledge is:
Usual? Are you trying to arrive at a destination or make your destination come to you? > > A true belief that has a casual connection with the > fact that makes it > true. That's not my def of knowing. Understanding has to be able to transcend common definition. If it is constrained, one can never see outside of the box. > > The standard example is that I may believe that Tom > has bought a blue > car because I saw him drive up in it. And Tom has > bought a blue car - > so the belief is true. But it isn't knowledge > because the car I saw > him drive up in is a rental car, not the one he > bought. So in this > example there is no casual connection between my > belief and the fact > that Tom bought a blue care, and hence my true > belief is not knowledge. > > Brent Meeker > This is sequential thinking. One can know all about Tom before Tom is ever born. What you're describing to me looks like the mechanics of sequential thinking. People might generate models to describe their observations and if those models jive with those models of others, we say it's factual because we can all agree on what we're talking about. In effect, all we've done is find a way to cooperate in thinking. A very limited thinking I might add. At one level, our whole world seems to be built upon common languages which imply thought processes that yield consistent reproducible results. By language I mean any common mode of interrelating, not necessarily the spoken word. You take your def of *knowledge* or *knowing*, it's simply a best guess agreed upon by a large enough body of people to secure that definition in common usage. The spoken and written languages were not manufactured by scientists, they evolved with humanity. It is only since the advent of scientific thought that we have attempted to constrain meanings of things to make the easy to analyze. One must realize in the attempt to constrain common everyday experience to a finite conceptual space, that something will be lost in the translation. If you are constraining your arguments to a conceptual space that you all have agreed upon and are happy in throwing away what you could not translate, then there should be no contention. But if you are taking this constrained conceptual and thought space and then trying to impose it on others, I foresee a problem. These discussions seem to delve into various realms of understanding and belief systems. If one is attempting to translate these belief systems into your sterilized conceptual and thought space, one will obviously only see what the rules of this concept space will allow him to see. If however, one attempts to force the conceptual spaces of others to obey *this* analytical conceptual space, not only will something be lost, but free thinking will suffer. I mention this not because I see it as a problem here so much as I see it as a general clash between scientific thinking types and others. This issue and it's ramifications in translating observables from one conceptual space to another could be the subject of a lengthy debate all by itself. I mention it here because there doesn't seem to be a declared line of definition between common meanings and scientific definitions of common meanings. I also mention it because it seems that much of the dicussion here is forcing understanding through symbolic logic. Doesn't this present the problem of the excluded middle concept? Robert W. __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Auctions - buy the things you want at great prices http://auctions.yahoo.com/