At 22:46 -0700 8/07/2002, Hal Finney wrote: > >If my mind, as a physical or computational system, is instantiated >in multiple places, whether multiple universes, multiple branches of a >many-worlds interpretation (MWI), or even multiple places and times in one >universe, the question is how that appears to me from the first-person >perspective. I am adopting a position that from my point of view, it >is indeterminate which of those instantiations I am now experiencing. >There is no "fact of the matter" as to which one is me, now. > >The alternative is to say that although all of these instantiations >are in some sense indistinguishable, nevertheless the instances of >consciousness produced by these systems are all distinct. That is, for >each instance of consciousness, there is a single physical system which >creates that consciousness. All of the physical systems are similar, or >even locally identical, so that the consciousness instances produced are >all structurally the same. But nevertheless we would not say that there >is one consciousness which spans all the implementations; rather, there >are multiple consciousnesses which merely "look alike from the inside". > >Anyway, that is the opposite of the view I am taking for the purposes >of this discussion. I am assuming the former position, that my present >consciousness is being instantiated widely throughout the multiverse >and I can with equal justification think that I am experiencing any >of those instantiations.
Or even, perhaps, that "I am experiencing" all instantiations at once. Eventually it will be the relative proportion of differentiating (or bifurcating) history-instantiations which should count. >My consciousness, in that sense, spans many >parts of the multiverse, and the question of "which universe am I in" >has no unique answer. I would even say that the question is meaningless. It is not clear that all "my" possible experiences can be associate with "well defined universe". I think I agree with Hal Finney. Hal, do you defend this position or was it only for the purpose of the discussion. Have you a definite opinion? ========== Wei, I hope my way of talking yesterday didn't seem too rude. I am really trying hard to understand what you don't understand about the necessity to take into account the comp 1-indeterminacy in TOE, once comp is postulated (comp = Church thesis + minimal amount of arithmetical realism + there is a level of self-description such that my private experience doesn't change for functional substitutions made at that level). Bruno
