I've never quite seen what the issue is with defining "you". But in
any case, option 1 below roughly corresponds to the ASSA position, and
option 2 to the RSSA.
The empirical problem with the ASSA is that under most reasonable
proposals for the absolute measure, observer moments corresponding to
younger people have higher measure than older people. Whilst the
reference class issue puts a lower bound on how old you would expect
to be, it seems unlikely that children aged 4 or 5 could be considered
excluded from the reference class - I can remeber being conscious at
that age, and children of that age seem conscious from the outside.
The second problem with the ASSA is lack of subjective time. I have
always argued that subjective time is necessary to experience anything
at all. This is a direct consequence of computationalism, but I think
is more basic than computationalism (since I don't really count myself
as a computationalist).
Now I don't expect to convince you of this - I never succeeded in
persuading Jacques Mallah. However I do want to point out that even
with the ASSA, one should not expect to experience survival of the WTC
with some loss of memories. The most likely outcome is another
observer moment with high measure - namely being a newborn baby. In
other words, what you'd experience is reincarnation.
To get the effect you were suggesting would require another type of
SSA, about which I have complete failure of imagination.
Cheers
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> I have always found the RSSA rather strange. From the discussion between
> Mallah and Maloney:
>
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1362.html
>
> > > one must first define "you". There are three reasonable
> > > possibilities in the ASSA:
> > > 1. One particular observer-moment. You have no past and no future.
> > > 2. A set of observer moments linked by computation. With this
> > > definition the problem is that "you" may be two (or more) people
> > > at the same time! The advantage with this definition is that one
> > > can predict effective probabilities of what "you" will see at other
> > > times similar to what you want to do with the RSSA. Thing is, if
> > > there is nonconservation of measure, the predictions start to differ
> > > from the RSSA about things like how old you should expect to be.
> > > Remember, testable prediction do NOT depend on definitions, so it is
> > > often better to use def. #1 to prevent such confusion.
> > > 3. A particular implementation of an extended computation. Similar to
> > > 2; allows death, when that implementation ends. I prefer this or
> #1.
>
> #1 seems the most reasonable option to me. You do away with the reference
> class problem. Also it is fully consistent with ''normal'' physics.
>
> Saibal
>
>
>
>
>
> ----- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----
> Van: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Aan: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> CC: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Verzonden: Sunday, November 02, 2003 05:45 AM
> Onderwerp: Re: Quantum accident survivor
>
>
> > I disagree. You can only get an effect like this if the RSSA is
> > invalid. You've been on this list long enough to remember the big
> > debates about RSSA vs ASSA. I believe the ASSA is actually contrary to
> > experience - but never mind - in order to get the effect you want you
> > would need an SSA that is neither RSSA nor ASSA, but something *much*
> > weirder.
> >
> > Cheers
> >
> > Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > >
> > > There have been many replies to this. I would say that you wouldn't
> expect
> > > to survive such accidents.
> > >
> > > Assume that we are sampled from a probability distribution over a set of
> > > possible states. E.g. in eternal inflation theories all possible quantum
> > > states the observable universe can be in are all realized, so all
> possible
> > > situations you can be in, do occur with some finite probability. In such
> > > theories you ''always'' exist.
> > >
> > > But this doesn't mean that if you are Mohammed Atta saying your prayer
> just
> > > before impact with the WTC, your next experience is that the plane has
> > > tunneled through the WTC without doing any harm. This is because there
> are
> > > many more Mohammed Attas in the universe that do not have this
> experience.
> > > So, you would ''survive'', but in a different branch with memory loss
> plus
> > > some aditional ''false'' memories. In that branch you wouldn't have been
> in
> > > that plane to begin with.
> > >
> > > You should think of yourself at any time as if you were chosen by a
> random
> > > generator sampled from a fixed probability distribution over the set of
> all
> > > possible states you can be in. The state that corresponds to you have
> > > experienced flying through the WTC is assigned an extremely small
> > > probability.
> > >
> > > How does this square with the normal experience of continuity through
> time?
> > > Well, every ''observer moment'' as chosen by the random generator has a
> > > memory of past experiences. So, if you go to bed now and wake up the
> next
> > > morning, you have the feeling of continuity, but this is only because
> the
> > > person waking up has the memory of going to bed.
> > >
> > > You could just as well say that the person going to bed survives in any
> one
> > > of the possible states he can be in. The state that happens to have the
> > > memory of going to bed is just one of these possible states. That
> particular
> > > state has the illusion of being the continuation of the first state.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > ---- Oorspronkelijk bericht -----
> > > Van: "David Kwinter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Aan: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > Verzonden: Friday, October 31, 2003 02:58 AM
> > > Onderwerp: Quantum accident survivor
> > >
> > >
> > > > Another quickie:
> > > >
> > > > Assume I survive a car/plane crash which we assume could have many
> > > > different quantum outcomes including me (dead || alive)
> > > >
> > > > Since I was the same person (entire life history) up until the
> > > > crash/quantum 'branch' - then can't I assume that since there was at
> > > > least one outcome where I survived, that TO ME I will always survive
> > > > other such life/death branches?
> > > >
> > > > Furthermore if I witness a crash where someone dies can I assume that
> > > > the victim will survive in their own "world" so far as at least one
> > > > quantum branch of survivability seems possible?
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > David Kwinter
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
> > A/Prof Russell Standish Director
> > High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119
> (mobile)
> > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
> > Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Room 2075, Red Centre
> http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> > International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
> > --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
> >
>
>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Prof Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
