Fwd: Re: Are we simulated by some massive computer?

[Kory Heath]

Forwarded at the request of the author:

From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

On 25 April 2004 Kory Heath wrote:

QUOTE-
Yes, your theory states that the chances are 100% that some copy will find 
itself in the non-bizarre world. But the theory also states that the 
chances are very low - one in a billion - that *I* will be that copy. Why 
isn't this second probability important? It seems to me that you only care 
about the first probability, and disregard the second as irrelevant.
-ENDQUOTE

Lets go over this again. There is a 100% chance that some copy of Kory 
Heath will find himself in the non-bizarre world, even though there will 
be one billion copies which find themselves in the bizarre worlds. If that 
single, lucky copy is not *you*, then who is he? Or rather, I should ask, 
if you are not *you*, then who are you? Force of habit makes us think that 
only one copy can be the "real" you, which is what you are assuming when 
you say that "the chances are very low - one in a billion - that *I* will 
be that copy". If all these copies exist, then each is equally entitled to 
claim to be the "real" you, and each will probably stamp his foot and 
insist that he (and he alone) *is* the real you. This is what I tried to 
show with my teleportation vacation thought experiment. The stay-home copy 
believes he has been cheated because he (the "real" he, in his opinion) 
missed out on seeing the planets, whereas in fact two thousand copies with 
equal claim to being the "real" person did find themselves off Earth.

I suppose our minds really are not designed to deal with the concept of 
multiple copies of ourselves. We insist that there can only be one copy 
extant at a time, and reason as if this is the case. It becomes less 
problematic if we talk only about third person probabilities.

Incidentally, this point applies to any "many worlds" theory, not just the 
Platonia idea.

--Stathis Papaioannou