From: Hal Ruhl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: An All/Nothing multiverse model Date: Tue, 07 Dec 2004 10:46:04 -0500
Hi Jesse:
To clarify - the All contains all information simultaneously [see the definition in the original post] - including ALL Truing machines with ALL possible output tapes - so it contains simultaneously both output tapes re your comment below.
But if there is a fact which is true in one "world" being simulated by a given Turing machine, but false in a different Turing machine simulation, that doesn't mean that "the All" is contradictory. After all, the statement "this planet contains life" is true of Earth but not true of Pluto, but that doesn't mean the solar system is contradictory, it just means that different facts are true of different planets. Similarly, if the All contains all "possible worlds" in some sense (all possible Turing machine programs, for example), then different facts could be true of different worlds, without this meaning the All itself is inconsistent. If Turing machine program #2334 simulates a 3-dimensional universe while Turing machine program #716482 simulates a 2-dimensional universe, that doesn't mean the inconsistent statements "the universe is 3-dimensional" and "the universe is 2-dimensional" are simultaneously true in the All--rather, it just means the statements "the universe described by program #2334 is 3-dimensional" and "the universe described by program #716482 is 2-dimensional" are simultaneously true in the All, and there is no contradiction between these statements. As long as you always describe the *context* of any statement, I don't see any reason why we should describe the All as inconsistent. So if you think the All is inconsistent somehow, you need to explain in more detail why you think this is.
Also, you didn't answer my earlier question about whether your idea of the All only includes worlds that could be simulated on a Turing machine, or if it also includes worlds that could be simulated by a "hypercomputer" which is capable of performing uncomputable operations (like instantly deciding if a given Turing machine program will halt or not).
Jesse
