I am not a scientist, just an avid reader of the fascinating ideas presented in your discussion threads. Although I frequently get lost, particularly when the math enters into it, I keep on reading everyone's comments and the links that you frequently provide to more thorough discussions of the topic at hand. I have learned so much, and been amazed to discover that work is actually being done on topics that I would only have imaged to be the stuff of science fiction. I just wanted everyone to know how much I appreciate reading whatever you have to say; you have all expanded my mind, I thank you, and I would imagine that there are many more readers like me out there who remain silent but in awe.
Jeanne ----- Original Message ----- From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "printmodel" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <everything-list@eskimo.com> Sent: Sunday, April 24, 2005 7:10 AM Subject: Re: parallel universes > > Le 18-avr.-05, ā 04:13, printmodel a écrit : > > >> Has anyone on the list experienced personal elevations into > > > >> one or more of these parallel universes, I have and would like to > >> exchange info > > > > > >>> mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world.< > >> > >> JC: Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how > > ...snip... > >> that this is > >> incorrect. Can you show why it is incorrect? Thanks, > >> Norman Samish > >> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal > > consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even > > given > > infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a > > "complete" world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the case that > > given > > infinite time, eveything that can happen must happen. I must admit > > this is > > not my area of expertise; but it seems to me that the only other > > option of > > defining a world (identifying it with the FS itself) will, by Godel's > > incompleteness theorem, necessitate that there exist unprovable true > > propositions of world; the world will be incomplete, so again, not > > everything that can happen will happen. > > Bruno? > > > > Jonathan Colvin > > I would say that by definition worlds are complete. For example you > could identify > a world with the collection of all true propositions in that world. > Gödel's incompleteness > applies to theories, FS, or machine trying to talk on the world(s). > Everything that can happen *to a machine" does happen *to some machine* > in the > precise sense that the Universal Dovetailer (the "splashed" UTM) > generate all "machine > dreams (computation seen from the 1-pov)". "physical "realities emerge > from coherence > condition related to the mathematical structure of "all computations + > 1-pov. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >