Lee writes: >> Jonathan: Bruno's claim is a straightforward consequence of Strong AI; that a >> simulated mind would behave in an identical way to a "real" one, and >> would experience the same "qualia". There's no special "interface" >> required here; the simulated mind and the simulated billiard >ball are >> in the same "world", ie. at the same level of simulation. As far as >> the simulated person is concerned, the billiard ball is "real". Of >> course, the simulation can also contain a simulation of the billiard >> ball (2nd level simulation), which will equally be unable to bruise >> the simulated person, and so on ad infinitum. If we take Bostrom's >> simulation argument seriously, we all exist in some Nth level >> simulation, while our simulated billiard ball exists at the >(N+1)th level. > >Now just to keep our bookkeeping accurate, Bruno Marchal's >claims far exceed what you have written. > <snip> >No, the important claims that Bruno makes go far beyond. He >attempts to derive physics from the theory of computation >(i.e., recursive functions, effective computability, >incompleteness, and unsolvability). >His is also one set of the claims, hypotheses, and conjectures >that attempt to reduce physics to a completely timeless abstract world. >Julian Barbour, in The End of Time, gave, as you probably >know, one of the most brilliant presentations from this perspective.
Sure; but I was just addressing the observation by Bruno that a description of a ball can bruise you (if you are also a description). That observation is not unique to Bruno's Comp; it applies to any theory that accepts the premise of Strong AI. Jonathan
