> Stathis: OK then, we agree! It's just that what I (and many others) > refer to as qualia, you refer to as the difference between a > description of a thing and being the thing. I hate the word > "dualism" as much as you do (because of the implication that > we may end up philosophically in the 16th century if we yield > to it), but haven't you just defined a very fundamental kind > of dualism, in aknowledging this difference between a thing > and its description? It seems to me, in retrospect, that our > whole argument has been one over semantics.
Well, that would be a novel application of "dualism", I think. A description of a thing, and *a thing* seem to be two very different categories; dualism would usually imply one is talking about dualistic properties of the *same thing*. I'm still inclined to deny that "qualia" refers to anything. It is a mental fiction. >Dennett (whom I > greatly respect) goes to great lengths to avoid having impure > thoughts about something being beyond empirical science or > logic. David Chalmers ("The Conscious Mind", 1996) accepts > that it is actually simpler to admit that consciousness is > just an irreducible part of physical existence. We accept > that quarks, or bitstrings, or whatever are irreducible, so > why is it any different to accept consciousness or > what-it-is-like-to-be-something-as-distinct-from-a-description > -of-something > (which is more of a mouthful) on the same basis? The argument from Dennet (which I'm inclinced to agree with) would be that we can not accept "what-is-it-likeness" as an irreducible thing because there is no such thing as "what is it likeness". Jonathan Colvin > > --Stathis Papaioannou > > > > [quoting Stathis] > > > > >My curiosity could only be satisfied if I were in fact the > > > duplicated > > > > >system myself; perhaps this could be achieved if I "became > > > one" with > > > > >the new system by direct neural interface. I don't have to > > > go to such > > > > >lengths to learn about the new system's mass, volume, > > > behaviour, or > > > > >any other property, and in *this* consists the essential > > > difference > > > > >between 1st person and 3rd person experience. You can > > > minimise it and > > > > >say it doesn't really make much practical difference, > but I don't > > > > >think you can deny it. > > > > > > > >I can deny that there is anything special about it, beyond the > > > >difference between A): *a description of an apple*; and B): > > > *an apple*. > > > >I don't think anyone would deny that there is a > difference between > > > >A and B (even with comp there is still a difference); but this > > > "essential > > > >difference" does not seem to have anything in particular > to do with > > > >qualia or experience. > > > > > > > >Jonathan Colvin > > > > > > Stathis: Can the description of the apple, or bat, or whatever > > > meaningfully include what it is like to be that thing? > > > >My argument (which is Dennet's argument) is that "what it is > like to be > >that thing" is identical to "being that thing". As Bruno > points out, in > >3rd person level (ie. the level where I am describing or > simulating an > >apple), a description can not "be" a thing; but on the 1st > person level > >(where a description *is* the thing, from the point of view of the > >thing, inside the simulation, as it were), then the description does > >"include" what it is like to be that thing. But "include" is not the > >correct word to use, since it subtly assumes a dualism (that > the qualia > >exist somehow separate from the mere description of the thing); the > >description *just is* the thing. > > > >Jonathan > > > > _________________________________________________________________ > MSN Messenger v7. Download now: http://messenger.ninemsn.com.au/ > >