Stathis: Now, I think you > >> will agree (although Jonathan Colvin may not) that despite this > >> excellent understanding of the processes giving rise to human > >> conscious experience, the aliens may still have absolutely no idea > >> what the experience is actually like. > > > > Jonathan Colvin: No, I'd agree that they have no idea what the experience is > like. But > > this is no more remarkable than the fact that allthough we > may have an > > excellent understanding of photons, we can not travel at > the speed of > > light, or that although we may have an excellent understanding of > > trees, yet we can not photosynthesize. Neither of these "problems" > > seem particularly hard. > > > Bruno: But we can photosynthesize. And we can understand why we > cannot travel at the speed of light. All this by using purely > 3-person description of those phenomena in some theory. > With consciousness, the range of the debate goes from > non-existence to only-existing. The problem is that it seems > that an entirely 3-person explanation of the brain-muscles > relations evacuates any purpose for consciousness and the > 1-person. That's not the case with photosynthesis.
You can photosynthesize? I certainly can not (not being a tree). If I had photosynthetic pigments in my skin, I suppose I could; and if I had rubbery wings and sharp teeth I'd be a bat (if my aunt had wheels, she'd be a wagon). I still can not see (intellectually) the "problem" of consciousness. Consciousness /qualia, 1st person phenomena, etc, IMHO, being very poorly defined, and likely non-existing entities, are a precarious pillar to base any cosmology or metaphysics on. "Observer" is far superior, and lacks the taint of dualism. To borrow a page from Penrose, I see qualia in much the same light as a shadow. Everyone can agree what a shadow is, point to one, and talk about them. But a shadow is not a thing. The ancients made much ado about shadows, ascribing all sorts of metaphysical significance and whatnot to them. I think it is quite likely that the fuss about consciousness and qualia resurrects this old mistake. Shadows of the mind, indeed. Jonathan Colvin
