----- Original Message ----- From: Patrick Leahy <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Everything-List <everything-list@eskimo.com> Sent: 26 May 2005 19:54 Subject: RE: White Rabbit vs. Tegmark . . . > * But the arbitrariness of the measure itself becomes the main argument > against the everything thesis, since the main claimed benefit of the > thesis is that it removes arbitrary choices in defining reality.
I don't think we can reject the thesis that all logically possible universes exist, just because its analysis is proving tricky (or even if it were to prove beyond us), and certainly not if we have reasonable candidates for a measure basis. I use fundamental philosophical principles effectively to infer the existence of all possible distinguishable entities (which would include both individual, and clusters of, physical universes), much if not all of which should be modellable by formal systems. In the context of SAS-containing universes, this seems to me a reasonable starting point for an in-principle measure basis, particularly when consideration of 'compressed' entities (not logically disbarred) leads to a prediction of the predominance of simpler universes. But I agree that going any further with particular predictions, particularly after factoring in Tegmark's other levels, is likely to prove, shall we say, at least a little way off ;) Alastair Philosophy paper at: http://www.physica.freeserve.co.uk/pa01.htm
