Le 03-juin-05, à 06:20, Lee Corbin a écrit :
[Stephen:] What if "I", or any one else's 1st person aspect, can not
be copied?
If the operation of copying is impossible, what is the status of all
of these thought experiments?
I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of
QM.
Exercise: 1) Show by a qualitative informal reasoning that if we are
Turing emulable then a no-cloning theorem is a necessity. Show more
precisely that IF I am duplicable at some description level THEN if I
observe myself below that substitution level I will discover that I am
made from "object" relying on an infinity (a continuum) of information
states/histories (hardly duplicable "stuff"). Hint: (re)read the UDA.
Exercise 2) (For Stephen :) Show that the 1-person is not 1-duplicable,
show that it is not even 1-nameable. (This can be done also by a
qualitative informal reasoning, but it is also beautifully obtainable
with G and G*, S4Grz, ...)
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
