Bruno Marchal writes: > And that illustrates the advantage of the comp theory, it gives by > construction the correct physics, without any need, for a comp > "believer" to verify it. Except, of course, that comp need to be > postulated and we must be open it is could be false. With comp, you > see, physics is approached in a radically different way. Different from > the 2300 years of Aristotelian Naturalism: comp makes us to go back to > Plato. Updtated by Godel's discoveries (and Church, Turing, etc.).
Let me see if I understand how you construct the correct physics from comp. You start with the principle of the Universal Dovetailer, which creates all possible universes. You then examine those universes for subsystems which are consistent with your own first-person conscious experiences. You set up some kind of measure over this selected subset of universes. (The Universal Dovetailer perhaps implies the Universal Distribution.) And based on this measure you arrive at first-person indeterminacy about which laws of physics hold for you. Is that right, is that the mechanical procedure by which someone derives their laws of physics from comp? Hal Finney