--- 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Le 01-avr.-06, à 00:46, 1Z a écrit :
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >> And read perhaps the literature on the mind
> body problem: all
> > >> materialist approaches has failed, and then the
> result I got explains
> > >> what it should be so.
> > >
> > > I have my own analysis of the problem: the
> words "map" and "territory"
> > > feature.
> >
> >
> > All right but sometime map are continuously or
> computationally embedded
> > in the territory, and so there is a fixed point
> where the point of the
> > map coincide with the point of the territory:
> typically yhe indexical
> > "where you are", both with respect to the
> territory and its mapped
> > representation.
>
> That's still isomorphism. What I mean is that there
> is no
> problem in the concept that matter can be conscious.
> The
> problem is in finding consicousness in 3rd-person
> descriptions of
> matter.
>
And what, if I may ask, is that "matter" which should
have "consciousness'?
Bruno's question of recent "what is physical" has not
been answered (to my satisfaction at least). Now we
may add this one to it.
My 13 year old definition of consciousness (which I do
not stand by anymore, but did not find a better one)
"Acknowledgement of and reply to information (= any
difference accepted by anything) could be applied if
we had an ID for 'matter' - of which the finest
ultimate ingredients in the contemporary
(reductionist) science do not include anything
matter-like (eg. quarks?) only effects we observe in
relation with other effects.
So: WHAT can be conscious?
John M
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