Le 07-avr.-06, à 17:46, 1Z a écrit :
> To be precise, there is no problem with a very basic, simple notion of > bare substance being the substrate, the bearer, of phenomenal > properties as well > as physical properties. Are you aware of the mind body problem. Are you aware the problem is still open. > if you assume comutationalism (as a I undertand it, not as you > understand it) > you are already assuming > the existence of matter, since computers are material. ... You just tell me that you are the one assuming that computers are material, so your are begging the question. > The slide from idealism to solipsis is inevitable. Pythagoras and Plato already showed counterexamples. If numbers generate a "video-game" sort of reality, the game could still a priori be sharable, unless you prove the contrary. > If the existence of > matter > is not needed to explain my experiences, the existence of other > experiencers > with their own experiences is not neeed to explain my experience > either. Possible, but not necessary. Other minds appears in comp through the notion of first person plural, (arising from the duplication of entire population of individuals) and this leads to a notion of "arithmetical entanglement". Actually theory like Shmidhuber or Hal Finney UDIST, could probably justify the existence of genuine other minds, and this despite they are lacking the 1/3 distinction povs. They suppress nevertheless successfully the 3 person white rabbits, and this explains, I guess for them, the negligible probability that someone behaving like a human is a zombie. The 1/3 distinction needs a more detailed treatment and the question is obviously still open. Please follow your intuition if you believe you could find a contradiction in comp, as I understand it. I mean you could be right, but until now, you don't really argue in your posts. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
