L'esprit de l'escalier: after reading my post below as an interesting list-post it occurred that I left out an important addage: I may feel as the same person (self) in my earlier life and situations - I do not IDENTIFY with 'it'. I know: "it is me" but not "I am like that". Not even: "I was like that" - I observe it as an interesting book I read already. Or something thelike. Just to add to the happy misunderstanding
John M --- John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > I read the remark of Russell and Satathis's reply > with > great interest. > Russell wrote (among others): > * > > > ...The change into > > > Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as > > >one would have to > > > pass through non-functional brain structures in > > >order to change from me to him.< < > * > reflecting a rather mechanistic-physicalist view of > a > mentality in 'degrees' followable by (not > substantial?) alterations from a (nonfunctioning, > but > assumed?) prior state, I would suggest: in > infinitesimal steps as in the well esstablished > qualia > of calculus. Russell seems to disagree, taking the > analog view (in kind). > Let me return to this after 2 quotes from Stathis's > reply: > * > 1. > However, technical feasibility is not the > >point. > >The point is that *if* > > (let's say magically) your mind were gradually > > transformed, so that your > > thoughts became more and more Napoleonic and less > > and less Standishian, > > then by this process, you would become Napoleon. > * > 2. >...the old man remembers being a young > > man, the young man > > remembers being a child, but the old man does not > > remember being a > > child. Although the old man has no recollection of > > being a child, he > > still identifies as being the same person as that > > child because there is > > a continuous series of intermediates each of whom > > recalls the one > > immediately prior, if not the ones several stages > > earlier. > * > Comparing the two I find Russell's position more > mentality-oriented than Stathis' (more mechanistic), > however he mentions Parfit's "personal identity" > tested in thought-experiments. (I dislike thought > experiments as artefacts composed to rationalize > upon > one's not so rational ideas into a fabricated sci-fi > situation.) > > The personal identity (I call it: SELF?) is an open > question. The old man identifies himself with all > stages of his earlier life even if episodes emerge > he > did not actively remember. (I know, I do). It is > more > than stepping backwards in phases. It transcends > time, > particular qualia-attributes, rationale and > approval. > I identify (an arthritic octagenerian) with the teen > youngster who made that memorable ski-jump. I feel > it... also the frustration when at school I was not > prepared and could not recite the poem which I now > know quite well. > Self is more than 'degrees of bodily, emotionally or > mentally experienced states', it is "myself in total > ambiance" (a situation psych cannot handle and > physics > has no units to measure). It does not end by the > skin > and not by personal thoughts. It includes a > complexity > of the 'situations' without transition of > "yesterday's > me" into Napoleon. Triggered? yes. Explained? not > yet. > > (My problem with MWI transitions of Q-suicide ideas: > > what part of 'SELF' are we talking about? it > includes > the totality as e/affecting us (and vice versa), > very > much as THIS universe circumstances and in another > ambiance the same 'self' is not identifiable. Same > question as in reincarnation: who is "I" > reincarnated?) Self is a mentally interrelated part > of > the totality with some inside reflection to itself > (no > good words available). Sort of a duality? Relational > compolsition? > It works in all of us, I have no idea if less > neuronic > animals have it (never asked them) or plants, > galaxies? > > Besides: 'self' related things go atemporal - > aspatial. > Not followable in time-series or state-space series. > It is not analysably changing details from A-C > through > B. > It is - well, who knows? - a (complex) quality-jump > in > some 'analog'(?) manner, if we think comp. > I still do not know HOW to think about it. > > John M > > > > > --- Stathis Papaioannou > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > Russell Standish writes: > > > > > >Even though it is very unlikely to happen in > > reality, it is easy > > > > enough to imagine that the relatively minor > > physical/psychological > > > > changes that have occurred in the past day are > > exaggerated, so that > > > > instead of changing from me-yesterday to > > me-today, I change from > > > > me-yesterday into Napoleon. The point is that > > this type of radical > > > > change would be different in *degree*, not > > different in kind from > > the > > > > type of change that occurs normally. One could > > even argue that > > turning > > > > > > Sure, but that's exactly where I'm in > > disagreement. The change into > > > Napoleon is a difference in kind, not degree, as > > one would have to > > > pass through non-functional brain structures in > > order to change from > > me to > > > him. Whereas to change from me to me as I was > > twenty years ago can be > > > achieved by passing through functional brain > > structures (all the > > > instances of me over the last twenty years). > > > > I don't see why you are so sure about the > necessity > > of passing through > > non-functional brain structures going from you to > > Napoleon. After all, > > there is a continuous sequence of intermediates > > between you and a > > fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have > much > > more in common > > mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a > > fertilized ovum. > > However, technical feasibility is not the point. > The > > point is that *if* > > (let's say magically) your mind were gradually > > transformed, so that your > > thoughts became more and more Napoleonic and less > > and less Standishian, > > then by this process, you would become Napoleon. > It > > is analogous to the > > situation where the old man remembers being a > young > > man, the young man > > remembers being a child, but the old man does not > > remember being a > > child. Although the old man has no recollection of > > being a child, he > > still identifies as being the same person as that > > child because there is > > a continuous series of intermediates each of whom > > recalls the one > > immediately prior, if not the ones several stages > > earlier. This is what > > people actually believe and act on, for example if > a > > person is found > > guilty of a crime which he has since genuinely > > forgotten committing. The > > whole thrust of Parfit's philosophizing involves > > taking such normative > > definitions of personal identity and, by trying > them > > out in various > === message truncated === --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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