Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Bruno Marchal writes: > > >>> The cited article a rather emotional criticism of Chalmer's ideas.> > > Ah? >>> OK, surely you >>> know a better resume? > > > Perhaps this one: http://www.thymos.com/mind/chalmers.html > > Quoting: > >>>> Then Chalmers proceeds to present his own theory of consciousness, that he >>>> calls >>>> "naturalistic dualism" (but might as well have called "naturalistic >>>> monism"). It is a >>>> variant of what is known as "property dualism": there are no two >>>> substances (mental and >>>> physical), there is only one substance, but that substance has two >>>> separate sets of >>>> properties, one physical and one mental. Conscious experience is due to >>>> the mental >>>> properties. The physical sciences have studied only the physical >>>> properties. The physical >>>> sciences study macroscopic properties like "temperature" that are due to >>>> microscopic >>>> properties such as the physical properties of particles. Chalmers >>>> advocates a science that >>>> studies the "protophenomenal properties" of microscopic matter that can >>>> yield the >>>> macroscopic phenomenon of consciousness. His parallel with >>>> electromagnetism is powerful. >>>> Electromagnetism could not be explained by "reducing" electromagnetic >>>> phenomena to the >>>> known properties of matter: it was explained when scientists introduced a >>>> whole new set of >>>> properties (and related laws), the properties of microscopic matter that >>>> yield the >>>> macroscopic phenomenon of electromagnetism. Similarly, consciousness >>>> cannot be explained by >>>> the physical laws of the known properties but requires a new set of >>>> "psychophysical" laws >>>> that deal with "protophenomenal properties". Consciousness supervenes >>>> naturally on the >>>> physical: the "psychophysical" laws will explain this supervenience, they >>>> will explain how >>>> conscious experiences depend on physical processes. Chalmers emphasizes >>>> that this applies >>>> only to consciousness. Cognition is governed by the known laws of the >>>> physical sciences.<<< >>>> > > A lot of the stuff criticising Chalmer's thesis is quite strident, at least > by the usual academic > standards. It's not quite as severe as the reaction to Roger Penrose's > theories on the mind, but > almost. Many cognitive scientists seem to take anything not clearly > straightforward materialism > as automatically false or even nonsense. I sympathise with them to a degree: > I think we should > push materialism and reductionism as far as we can. But the inescapable fact > remains, I could > know every empirical fact about a conscious system, but still have no idea > what it is actually > like to *be* that system, as it were from the inside.
That's commonly said, but is it really true? Even without knowing anything about another person's brain you have a lot ideas about what it is like to be that person. Suppose you really knew a lot about an aritificial brain, as in a planetary probe for example, and you also knew a lot about your own brain and to you could compare responses both at the behavoiral level and at the "brain" level. I think you could infer a lot about what it was like to be that probe. You just couldn't directly experience its experiences - but that's not suprising. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
