Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
> 
> 
>>Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>
>>>Various people write:
>>>
>>>
>>>>blah blah ...recording... blah blah... consciousness... blah blah
>>>
>>>But WHY can't a recording be conscious? How do I know I'm not in
>>>a recording at the moment?
>>
>>The question is why you don't regard the recordings in your video
>>cabinet as conscious. Well, if you do, you have probably murdered
>>some people by taping over them.
> 
> 
> I'm responsible for a misunderstanding if you thought I meant "recording" 
> in the usual sense of the word, i.e. a copy of a limited subset (sound or 
> video, for example) of a subject's attributes over a period of time. What 
> I intended was a copy of all of the subject's attributes, but constrained 
> so that it will run the same way over and over, like an automaton. For 
> example, if you have an elaborate computer game with characters with 
> whom you can interact so they pass the Turing test, you can record the 
> whole session, including your keyboard inputs, and "play" it a second time. 
> The computer goes through exactly the same states the second time around, 
> but it really has no choice: the recording constrains its behaviour as 
> rigidly 
> as a video tape constrains the behaviour of the video player and TV (actually 
> more rigidly, since there is always some variation between runs with analogue 
> systems). Would you say that the characters in the game are conscious on 
> the first run but not on the second?
> 
> Stathis Papaioannou

I think this turns on the referent of "the characters".  If it means the 
sequence of 
computer states that represents the characters in that game - no.  If it means 
the 
programs that represent the characters, programs that would have responded 
differently had circumstances been different, then - yes.  At least that's the 
theory 
that consciousness depends on counterfactuals.

Brent Meeker

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