1Z wrote: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> Russell Standish writes: >> >> >>> On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>>> It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is >>>> assumed to be preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have >>>> acted differently even with identical environmental inputs, which is what >>>> the feeling of "free will" is. However, it is possible that I might *not* >>>> have been able to act differently: simply feeling that I could have done so >>>> is not evidence that it is the case. And even if it were the case, due to >>>> true quantum randomness or the proliferation of branches in the multiverse >>>> leading to the effect of first person indeterminacy, it does not follow >>>> that >>>> this is necessary for consciousness to occur. >>> >>> It is true that Maudlin's argument depends on the absurdity of a recording >>> being conscious. If you can accept a recording as being conscious, then you >>> would have trouble in accepting the conclusion that counterfactuals are >>> relevant. >> >> That's what I'm disputing. You can have a machine handling counterfactuals, >> like >> a thermostat, that aren't conscious (not much, anyway), and machines not >> handling counterfactuals, like a complex computer or human with rigidly >> constrained inputs, that is conscious. > > > Computer always have counterfactuals, because there changing one part of them > (whether data or programme) has an effect on the overall behaviour. Changing > one > part of a recording (e.g splicing a film) changes only *that* part.
But a branch in a program need not change very much. It seems that now you are introducing a new critereon, a degree of "counterfactualness" required for consciousness. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
