Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): > > > > > > > > > > I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but > > > > > > > you have > > > > > > > made the point several times that a computation depends on an > > > > > > > observer > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of > > > > > > assuming it must. > > > > > > It seems to me that some sort of absurdity or contradiction ensues. > > > > > > > > > > OK. This has been a long and complicated thread. > > > > > > > > > > > > for its meaning. I agree, but *if* computations can be conscious > > > > > > > (remember, > > > > > > > this is an assumption) then in that special case an external > > > > > > > observer is not > > > > > > > needed. > > > > > > > > > > > > Why not ? (Well, I would be quite happy that a conscious > > > > > > computation would have some inherent structural property -- > > > > > > I want to foind out why *you* would think it doesn't). > > > > > > > > > > I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a > > > > > conscious > > > > > computation has some inherent structural property. > > > > > > I should have said, that the *hardware* has some special structural > > > property goes > > > against computationalism. It is difficult to pin down the "structure" of > > > a computation > > > without reference to a programming language or hardware. > > > > It is far from impossible. If it keeps returning to the same state, > > it is in a loop, for instance. I am sure that you are tiching to point > > out > > that loops can be made to appear or vanish by re-interpretation. > > My point is that it is RE interpretation. There is a baseline > > set by what is true of a system under minimal interpretation. > > > > The idea is that the > > > same computation can look completely different on different computers, > > > > Not *completely* different. There will be a mapping, and it will > > be a lot simpler than one of your fanciful ones. > > > > > the corollary > > > of which is that any computer (or physical process) may be implementing > > > any > > > computation, we just might not know about it. > > > > That doesn't follow. The computational structure that a physical > > systems is "really" implementing is the computational structure that > > can > > be reverse-engineered under a minimally complex interpretation. > > > > You *can* introduce more complex mappings, but you don't *have* to. It > > is > > an artificial problem. > > You may be able to show that a particular interpretation is the simplest one, > but it > certainly doesn't have to be the only interpretation. Practical computers and > operating > systems are deliberately designed to be more complex than they absolutely > need to be > so that they can be backward compatible with older software, or so that it is > easier for > humans to program them, troubleshoot etc.
Of course. That is all part of their funcitonality. All that means is that if you reverse-egineer it , you conclude tha "this is a programme with debug code" , or "this is an application with self-diagnostic abilities". And you wouldn't be saying anything wrong. > A COBOL program will do the same computation > as the equivalent C program, on whatever machine it is run on. Of course. The programme is "really" the algorithm, not the code. > And I'm sure the physical > activity that goes on in the human brain in order to add two numbers would > make the most > psychotic designer of electronic computers seem simple and orderly by > comparison. Of course, Because humans add numbers together consciously. The consciousness is part of the functionallity. If it went missing during the reverse-engineering process, *that* would be a problem. > Stathis Papaioannou > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
