David Nyman wrote: > On Oct 7, 1:16 pm, "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Numbers that haven't been reified in any sense, > > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any > > way. > > Forgive me for butting in again, but is there not some way to stop this > particular disagreement from going round in circles interminably, > entertaining though it may be? For what it's worth, it seems to me that > Bruno has been saying that you get a number of interesting (and > unexpected) results when you start from a certain minimum set of > assumptions involving numbers and their relations.
Yes. But he says he isn't assuming Platonism, although he must be. > As he often > reiterates, this is a 'modest' view, making no claim to exclusive > explanatory truth, He claims that computationalism is incompatible with materialism. That is not modest (or correct AFAICS) > and - dealing as it does in 'machine psychology' - > limiting its claims to the consequences of 'interviewing' such machines > and discovering their povs. So how does he get "computationalism is incompatible with materialism" out of such interviews? > In achieving these results, AFAICS, no > claims need be made about the fundamental 'ontic realism' of numbers: > rather one is doing logic or mathematics from an axiomatic basis in the > normal way. How can he come to conclusions about the uneality of matter without assuming the reality of something to take its place? > The question of which set of 'ontic prejudices' we in fact employ as we > go about our daily affairs is of course another issue. And yet antoher issue is whether the conclusions of a valid arguiment must be contained in its premises. > It may of course > eventually turn out that theoretical or, preferably empirically > disconfirmable, results derived from comp become so compelling as to > force fundamental re-consideration of even such quotidian assumptions - > e.g. the notorious 'yes doctor' proposition. Bruon's empirical prediction require a UD to exist. That is an assumption beyond computationalism. > But as Bruno is again at > pains to point out, this won't be based on 'sure knowledge'. It will > always entail some 'act of faith'. > > To establish what is in some ultimate sense 'real' - as opposed to > knowable or communicable - is extraordinarily difficult, No, it's really easy. I am real, or I would not be writing this. What you mean is to establish it by abstract argumentation is difficult. Well, it is. That is why empiricists prefer empiricisim. > and perhaps at > root incoherent. The debate, for example, over whether the > computational supervenes on the physical doesn't hinge on the 'ontic > reality' of the fundamental assumptions of physicalism or > computationalism. Rather, it's about resolving the explanatory > commensurability (or otherwise) of the sets of observables and > relations characteristic of these theoretical perspectives. Indeed what > else could it possibly be for humans (or machines) with only such data > at our disposal? > > David > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > There is no need to reify the numbers.[...] > > > > > I don't think so. Once you accept that the number theoretical truth is > > > independent of you (which I take as a form of humility), then it can be > > > explained quite precisely why "numbers" (in a third person view-view) > > > are bounded to believe in a physical (third person sharable) reality > > > and in a unnameable first person reality etc.Numbers that haven't been > > > reified in any sense, > > don't exist in any way and therefore don't behave in any > > way. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---