Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Sorry for the comment delay. > > > Le 23-oct.-06, à 16:49, David Nyman a écrit : > > > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >>> As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not > >>> prove Platonism. > >> > >> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief > >> by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" > >> statements. > >> > > > > Lest we go yet another round in the 'reification' debate, is it not > > possible to reconcile what is being claimed here? > > > > Bruno, I'm assuming that when you eschew 'Platonic existence' for AR, > > you are thereby saying that your project is to formalise certain > > arguments about the logical structure of possibility - and through > > this, to put actuality to the test in certain empirical aspects. > > > Yes. Although people are so often wrong on what "formalization" > consists in, that I prefer to say that I just interview a machine. > > Questions of how this may finally be reconciled with 'RITSIAR' (I hope > > you recall what this means) are in abeyance. > > > I don't recall what RITSIAR means. Nor BU. "Real in the sense that I am real" "Block Universe" > > > > Nevertheless, some aspect > > of this approach may ultimately be ascribed a status as 'foundational > > existent' analogous to that of 'primary matter' in materialism. > > I don't think so. This would lead to a reification of numbers, which I > think is just a little bit less meaningless than reifying matter. But > still fundamentally wrong. If numbers aren't real at all they cannot generate reality (ITSIAR). > > Alternatively, such a hypothesis may be shown to be redundant or > > incoherent. > > Not really. It is SWE which should be made redundant. > > > > > > Peter, as we've agreed, materialism is also metaphysics, and as a route > > to 'ultimate reality' via a physics of observables, is vulnerable to > > 'reification'. Might it not be premature to finalise precisely what it > > is that physical theory decribes that might actually be RITSIAR? I have answered these questions before: but 1. Contingent existence. 2. The ability to causally interact 3. A primary substance which endures through change ( explaining dynamic, non-BU time) 4. Optionally, the ability to explain phenomenal consiousness in a basically non-mathematical way.(Property dualism) > You > > may be tempted to respond, Johnsonianly, that it is precisely the world > > that kicks back that is RITSIAR, but theoretical physics and COMP are > > both in the business of modelling what is not so directly accessible. > > > OK. > > > > > This notwithstanding that we may believe one or other theory to be > > further developed, more widely accepted, or better supported > > empirically. Or is there some irreducible sense in which 'primary > > matter' could be deemed to exist in a way that nothing else can? > > > Note that "consciousness" can be deemed to exist in a way that nothing > else can. In particular "consciousness of numbers". > But "Primary Matter", Ether, Phlogiston, Vital Principle, .... I doubt > it. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---