Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > Brent meeker writes: > > > > > >> That is not clear to me. Perhaps it turns on the meaning of > > >> "content" in an OM. Generally if my OM's are taken to be on the > > >> order of a second or longer, I think the order could be > > >> reconstructed from the content. But I also think there would be > > >> exceptions. For example if I'm startled by a loud noise this > > >> switches my consciousness on a time scale much shorter than 1sec to > > >> "What was that!?" and then, deciding it was not important, I switch > > >> back to what I was thinking of before. These thoughts are > > >> connected by *memory* but not by conscious content of OMs. Maybe > > >> there is a feeling of continuity in consciousness which doesn't > > >> survive chopping it up into OMs, i.e. each conscious thought has > > >> duration and overlaps preceding and suceding thoughts. But I think > > >> that either some such overlap or access to memory must be invoked > > >> to ensure that OMs can be ordered. > > > > > > We can distinguish between memory that actually is part of my present > > > conscious experience, such as when I am in the process of recalling > > > what I did yesterday, and memory that lies in waiting and available > > > for access should the need arise, such as just before I decided to > > > recall what I did yesterday. I would class the latter kind of memory > > > along with the rest of the machinery required to generate the > > > appropriate observer moments to give the experience of a coherent > > > stream of consciousness. If all this machinery were dispensed with, > > > and the OM's were generated magically just as if the underlying > > > stored memories etc. were still operational, no difference in the > > > stream of consciousness could occur. > > > > > > Pushing the idea to its limit, not only is it unnecessary for > > > anything external to the OM's to bind them together, it is > > > unnecessary for other OM's, past or future, to even exist. I would > > > still feel I have a past and expect I will survive into the future if > > > my entire lifespan is just one second long and all my memories false. > > > My hope that "I" will survive amounts to a hope that somewhere, > > > sometime, there will be an OM with appropriate memories and a sense > > > that he was and remains me. If such an OM does exist, it will > > > consider itself my successor regardless of whether I ever actually > > > existed. > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > That is not so clear to me as it seems to be to you. > > > > Suppose that being conscious is something a brain does. Then a > > Observer-second would be one second of that brain activity. When this OS > > was magically initiated it would already include potentials traveling down > > axons, etc, the residue of the previous OS and the precursors of later > > milliseconds in this OS. But those underlying physical processes are not > > what we generally think of as conscious. They are not things we would > > report if asked what we are thinking. Nevertheless they may be necessary > > for the continuity of consciousness, where consciousness here means the > > inner narrative - the story I tell myself in my head. In these thought > > experiments about OMs there seem to be two contrary implicit assumptions: > > > > (1) that just the content of the inner narrative constitutes consciousness, > > as in the analogy of cutting up a book and then reconstructing it's order > > from the content of the segments, > > > > (2) the feeling of continuity remains in a segment 1sec or 0.1sec or > > 0.01sec even if that is too short a segment to allow reconstruction of the > > order from the content. > > I suppose you could say that there is no feeling of continuity from one > microsecond to the next in a normally functioning brain either, because it > takes many microseconds to make a thought. My point is that whatever it takes > to make a thought and however vague the distinction between one thought and > the next is, arbitrarily slicing up the physical activity underlying > consciousness should not make a difference to the sense of continuity,
Should not, assuming physicalism? Should not, assuming computationalism? > and no explicit ordering is necessary. The counting sequence "one, two, > three" may involve millions of slices of brain activity or computer emulation > activity spread throughout space and time, and it may take many of these > slices to form a moment of consciousness just as it takes many milliseconds > of normal brain activity to form a moment of consciousness, but the feeling > of continuity should be preserved. Why? Maybe it supervenes on whatever propels one physical state to evolve into another. > Stathis Papaioannou > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
