Bruno Marchal writes:
> > The analogous statements are: > > > > a1. umbrellas keep you dry > > a2. feeding the poor reduces their suffering > > > > We can agree on the definition of the words and on the facts asserted. > > If > > there is disagreement on the definition, for example if you were > > thinking of > > a teapot when you heard the term "umbrella", then it would be a simple > > matter > > to show a picture of an umbrella and a teapot and resolve the > > misunderstanding. > > If there is a disagreement on whether umbrellas do in fact keep you > > dry, or > > whether feeding starving people reduces their suffering, then we could > > go out > > into the rain with and without an umbrella or interview a starving > > person before > > and after he has been fed, and reach agreement that way. > > > > In contrast, consider: > > > > b1. we should use umbrellas when going out in the rain > > b2. we should feed the poor if they are hungry > > > > We might expect that most people would agree with these statements. > > However, > > if there is disagreement, there is no way to resolve it. I could say > > that I don't care > > if I get wet, despite the discomfort, and I don't care if the poor > > starve, despite the > > fact that this will cause them suffering. I could even say that I do > > care about these > > things, but as part of my personal ethical system I don't believe it > > is good to use > > umbrellas or feed the poor. > > That last point is an interesting point, but to be sure it is even more > going in the direction that there is no normative theory of good/bad. > So if we are diverging on something it is perhaps that you believe > there is a normative theory of truth ? > All we can say is > > c1. IF you want keep yourself dry and if it is raining here and now > then using an umbrella can help you with such or such probability. > c2. If you want make that precise poor person less hungry (here and > now) then by giving him food you will get success with such or such > probability. > > All right ? (if not elaborate because it would mean I am missing > something). That's more or less the point I have been getting at. You can turn normative statements into descriptive ones by changing "you ought" into "if you want to... you ought". > > Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other > > ethical principles or commandments from God: > > > With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp > (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in > the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by > horrible monster ... > Witrh comp (and the "ideal" case of self-referentially correct machine) > it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the > same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes > are illustrate in taoist and buddhist tales). Any internet references for such tales? > > what I feel is what I feel, and that's > > all there is to it. > > Sure. > > > > You can try to persuade me that I should feel differently, > > That would be like a dentist asking his patient not to suffer ... If the feeling is a physical one, yes, but if it an opinion, an ethical belief, even a desire, peopel can be persuaded: that's what advertising and propaganda is about. > > but you > > can't do this by persuading me that I am wrong in my facts, my > > reasoning, or that > > we are defining terms differently. > > > OK. If you agree with c1 and c2. (I have added c1 and c2 because the > "should" can be use in the moral way, and then I agree with you; but it > can be used in the conditional sense, in which case nuance must be > added). I mean you cannot both > 1) believe that umbrellas keep you dry, 2) pretend you want to keep > yourself dry > and then go out without umbrellas (assuming all the default > assumptions, for example, don't give a counterexample like "the problem > is that my umbrella" is 42 km high .... that would make things out of > topics. OK: the problem is when "should" stands as an absolute. Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
