On Mar 15, 2:45 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> It's something Bruno, in particular, has discussed at length. Is it possible
> that 17 is only contingently prime?
Yes, in that it makes sense to argue (from a 'contingentist'
perspective) that the justification for 'primeness' (or indeed any
other concept) derives ultimately from persistent aspects of
contingent states of affairs (in this case a degree of persistence we
abstract as 'necessity'). So from this perspective 17 is
'necessarily' prime, but this very 'necessity' is limited to the
contingent framework that supports the conceptual one. In this view,
positing 'platonic primeness' does no further work. This is not to
take issue with Bruno's alternative numerical basis for contingency,
but rather to see it as just that - an alternative, not a knock-down
argument.
David
> On 3/15/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Mar 14, 10:18 pm, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
>
> > > Perhaps using the term "existence" for mathematical objects is
> > misleading.
> > > It doesn't mean they exist as separate objects in the real world, just
> > that
> > > they exist as concepts. This is mathematical Platonism.
>
> > Yes, I understand. I guess I'm saying that nevertheless I can
> > conceive of a radical negation in which even Platonic objects have no
> > existence, conceptual or otherwise. Consequently AFAICS arguments for
> > Platonic 'necessity' are in fact derived wholly from contingent states
> > of affairs.
>
> It's something Bruno, in particular, has discussed at length. Is it possible
> that 17 is only contingently prime?
>
> Stathis Papaiaonnou
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