Le 17-mars-07, à 00:11, Brent Meeker a écrit :

> But what is Platonia - Tegmarks all mathematically consistent 
> universe?  or Bruno's Peano arithmetic - or maybe Torny's finite 
> arithmetic (which would be a much smaller "everything").
>
> And how do things "run" in Platonia?  Do we need temporal modes in 
> logic, as well as epistemic ones?


Brent, for what I understand, you seem to believe in both a material 
primitive universe, and in the computationalist hypothesis. It is just 
up to you, then, to find an error in the Universal Dovetailer argument. 
This is a proof, a destructive platonic thought experiment in the sense 
of James Brown (the lboratory of mind) that you cannot have both 
materialism and computationalism. The argument should make us more 
modest: it shows that we have to explain matter from mind.

Then I provide a path for extracting physics from numbers, by 
interviewing Peano Arithmetic, or any lobian machine, and *she* forces 
an important number of nuanced distinction between computing, proving, 
knowing, and an infinity of commitment gamblings: which correspond to 
the (arithmetical hypostases):

p  (truth)
Bp (provable)
Bp & p (knowable, correctly provabie)

Bp & Dp (gamblings)
Bp & Dp & p (correct gambling, feeling)

And the incompleteness phenomenon multiplies by 2 most of the 
hypostases, by distinguishing what the machine can say about them and 
what is true about them. This gives 8 modal logics, which, as I have 
explained some time ago, determines each a "geometrical" (Kripke) 
multiverse.

It makes comp (and the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus 
theology) experimentally testable.

As I said in the FOR list, we have to take into account two major 
discovery:

The universal machine (talks bits)
The other universal machine (the quantum universal machine, she talks 
qubits).

The UDA shows that if comp is true there is necessary a path from bits 
to qubits, and, by the G G* distinction, it provided an explanation of 
both quanta and qualia from numbers (and addition and multiplication).

I have not extracted the measure (nor do I think Russell did to be 
honest), but I have extracted the logic of certainty (credibility one) 
associated to each hypostasis, and those corresponding to Plotinus 
Matter (or "our" measure *one*) is already perhaps enough quantum like 
to justify a quantum topology or "deep enough" universal machine.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to