On 26/06/07, John Mikes <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: JM: You mean a hallucination of x, when you * 'I just see x, hear x, feel x' and so forth' *. is included in your knowledge? or even substitutes for it? Maybe yes...
DN: "I am conscious of knowing x" is distinguishable from "I know x". The former has already differentiated 'knowing x' and so now "I know [knowing x]". And so forth. So knowing in this sense stands for a direct or unmediated 'self-relation', a species of unity between knower and known - hence its notorious 'incorrigibility'. JM: But then can you differentiate? (or this is no reasonable question?) DN: It seems that in the development of the individual at first there is no such differentiation; then we find that we are 'thrown' directly into a 'world' populated with 'things' and 'other persons'; later, we differentiate this from a distal 'real world' that putatively co-varies with it. Now we are in a position to make a distinction between 'plural' or 'rational' modes of knowing, and solipsistic or 'crazy' ones. But then it dawns that it's *our world* - not the 'real' one, that's the 'hallucination'. No wonder we're crazy! This evolutionarily-directed stance towards what we 'know' is of course so pervasive that it's only a minority (like the lost souls on this list!) who harbour any real concern about the precise status of such correlations. Hence, I suppose, our continual state of confusion. JM: The classic question: "Am I? and the classical answer: "Who is asking?" DN: Just so. Crazy, like I say. JM: Are you including 'humans' into the machines or the computers? And dogs? Amoebas? DN: Actually, I just meant to distinguish between 'machines' considered physically and computational processes. I really have no idea of course whether any non-human artefact will ever come to know and act in the sense that a human does. My point was only to express my logical doubts that it would ever do so in virtue of its behaving in a way that merely represents *to us* a process of computation. However, the more I reason about this the stranger it gets, so I guess I really 'dunno'. JM: Bruno is right: accepting that 'any machine' is part of its "outside(?) totality", i.e. embedded into its ambiance, I would be scared to differentiate myself. There is no hermetic 'skin' - it is transitional effects transcending back and forth, we just do not observe those outside the 'topical boundaries' of our actual observation (model, as I call it). DN: Yes: all is relation (ultimately self-relation, IMO), and 'boundaries' merely delimit what is 'observable'. In this context, what do you think about Colin's TPONOG post? Regards David On 6/23/07, David Nyman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Hi John.... > > ....(just your Italics par-s quoted in this reply. Then "JM: means present > text)): > > *DN: Since we agree to eliminate the 'obsolete noumenon', we can perhaps > re-phrase this as just: 'how do you know x?' And then the answers are of > the type 'I just see x, hear x, feel x' and so forth. IOW, 'knowing x' is > unmediated** - 'objects' like x are just 'embedded' in the structure of > the 'knower', and this is recursively related to more inclusive structures > within which the knower and its environment are in turn embedded. > * > JM: You mean a hallucination of x, when you * 'I just see x, hear x, feel > x' and so forth'*. > is included in your knowledge? or even substitutes for it? Maybe yes... > But then can you differentiate? (or this is no reasonable question?) > * > > > *((to JM: ...know if you are NOT conscious? Well, you wouldn't.)) > DN: Agreed. If we 'delete the noumenon' we get: "How would you know if > you are NOT?" or: "How would you know if you did NOT (know)?". To which we > might indeed respond: "You would not know, if you were NOT", or: "You would > not know, if you did NOT (know)". * > JM: The classic question: "Am I? and the classical answer: "Who is > asking?" > * > > *DN: I think we need to distinguish between 'computers' and 'machines'. I > can see no reason in principle why an artifact could not 'know', and be > motivated by such knowing to interact with the human world: humans are of > course themselves 'natural artifacts'. * itself embedded. > > JM: Are you including 'humans' into the machines or the computers? And > dogs? Amoebas? > The main difference I see here is the 'extract' of the "human world" (or: > "world, as humans can interpret what they learned") downsized to our > choice of necessity which WE liked to design into an artifact. (motors, > cellphones, AI, AL). Yes, we (humans etc.) are artefacts but 'use' a lot of > capabilities (mental etc. gadgets) we either don't know at all, or just > accept them as 'being human' (or an extract of human traits as 'being dog') > with no urge to build such into a microwave oven or an AI. > But then we are SSOO smart when we draw conclusions!!!!! > * > *DN: > Bruno's approach is to postulate the whole 'ball of wax' as computation, > so that any 'event' whether 'inside' or 'outside' the machine is 'computed' > *. > JM: > Bruno is right: accepting that 'any machine' is part of its "outside(?) > totality", i.e. embedded into its ambiance, I would be scared to > differentiate myself. There is no hermetic 'skin' - it is transitional > effects transcending back and forth, we just do not observe those outside > the 'topical boundaries' of our actual observation (model, as I call it). > > *DN:* > *The drift of my recent posts has been that even in this account, 'worlds' > can emerge 'orthogonally' to each other, such that from their reciprocal > perspectives, 'events' in their respective worlds will be 'imaginary'. * > JM: > I can't say: I have no idea how the world works, except for that little I > interpreted into my 1st person narrative. I accept "maybe"-s. > And I have a way to 'express' myself: I use "I dunno". > > Have fun > > John > > > > David > > > > > > > Dear David. > > > do not expect from me the theoretical level of technicality-talk er > > > get > > > from Bruno: I talk (and think) common sense (my own) and if the > > > theoretical technicalities sound strange, I return to my thinking. > > > > > > That's what I got, that's what I use (plagiarized from the Hungarian > > > commi > > > joke: what is the difference between the peoples' democracy and a > > > wife? > > > Nothing: that's what we got that's what we love) > > > > > > When I read your "questioning" the computer, i realized that you are > > > in the ballpark of the AI people (maybe also AL - sorry, Russell) > > > who select machine-accessible aspects for comparing. > > > You may ask about prejudice, shame (about goofed situations), humor > > > (does a > > > computer laugh?) boredom or preferential topics (you push for an > > > astronomical calculation and the computer says: I rather play some Bach > > > music now) > > > Sexual preference (even disinterestedness is slanted), or laziness. > > > If you add untruthfulness in risky situations, you really have a human > > > machine > > > with consciousness (whatever people say it is - I agree with your > > > evading > > > that unidentified obsolete noumenon as much as possible). > > > > > > I found Bruno's post well fitting - if i have some hint what > > > "...inner personal or self-referential modality..." may mean. > > > I could not 'practicalize' it. > > > I still frown when "abondoning (the meaning of) something but consider > > > > > > items as pertaining to it" - a rough paraphrasing, I admit. To > > > what?. > > > I don't feel comfortable to borrow math-methods for nonmath > > > explanations > > > but that is my deficiency. > > > > > > Now that we arrived at thequestion I replied-added (sort of) to > > > Colin's question I - > > > let me ask it again: how would YOU know if you are conscious? > > > (Conscious is more meaningful than cc-ness). Or rather: How would > > > you know if you are NOT conscious? Well, you wouldn't. If you can, > > > you are conscious. Computers????? > > > > > > Have a good weekend > > > > > > John Mikes > > > > > > > > > > > > On 6/20/07, David Nyman < [EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On Jun 5, 3:12 pm, Bruno Marchal < [EMAIL PROTECTED] > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Personally I don' think we can be *personally* mistaken about our > > > > own > > > > > consciousness even if we can be mistaken about anything that > > > > > consciousness could be about. > > > > > > > > I agree with this, but I would prefer to stop using the term > > > > 'consciousness' at all. To make a decision (to whatever degree of > > > > certainty) about whether a machine possessed a 1-person pov > > > > analogous > > > > to a human one, we would surely ask it the same sort of questions > > > > one > > > > would ask a human. That is: questions about its personal 'world' - > > > > what it sees, hears, tastes (and perhaps extended non-human > > > > modalitiies); what its intentions are, and how it carries them into > > > > practice. From the machine's point-of-view, we would expect it to > > > > report such features of its personal world as being immediately > > > > present (as ours are), and that it be 'blind' to whatever 'rendering > > > > > > > > mechanisms' may underlie this (as we are). > > > > > > > > If it passed these tests, it would be making similar claims on a > > > > personal world as we do, and deploying this to achieve similar ends. > > > > Since in this case it could ask itself the same questions that we > > > > can, > > > > it would have the same grounds for reaching the same conclusion. > > > > > > > > However, I've argued in the other bit of this thread against the > > > > possibility of a computer in practice being able to instantiate such > > > > a > > > > 1-person world merely in virtue of 'soft' behaviour (i.e. > > > > programming). I suppose I would therefore have to conclude that no > > > > machine could actually pass the tests I describe above - whether > > > > self- > > > > administered or not - purely in virtue of running some AI program, > > > > however complex. This is an empirical prediction, and will have to > > > > await an empirical outcome. > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > On Jun 5, 3:12 pm, Bruno Marchal < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > Le 03-juin-07, à 21:52, Hal Finney a écrit : > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Part of what I wanted to get at in my thought experiment is the > > > > > > bafflement and confusion an AI should feel when exposed to human > > > > ideas > > > > > > about consciousness. Various people here have proffered their > > > > own > > > > > > ideas, and we might assume that the AI would read these > > > > suggestions, > > > > > > along with many other ideas that contradict the ones offered > > > > here. > > > > > > It seems hard to escape the conclusion that the only logical > > > > response > > > > > > is for the AI to figuratively throw up its hands and say that it > > > > is > > > > > > impossible to know if it is conscious, because even humans > > > > cannot agree > > > > > > on what consciousness is. > > > > > > > > > > Augustin said about (subjective) *time* that he knows perfectly > > > > what it > > > > > is, but that if you ask him to say what it is, then he admits > > > > being > > > > > unable to say anything. I think that this applies to > > > > "consciousness". > > > > > We know what it is, although only in some personal and > > > > uncommunicable > > > > > way. > > > > > Now this happens to be true also for many mathematical concept. > > > > > Strictly speaking we don't know how to define the natural numbers, > > > > and > > > > > we know today that indeed we cannot define them in a communicable > > > > way, > > > > > that is without assuming the auditor knows already what they are. > > > > > > > > > > So what can we do. We can do what mathematicians do all the time. > > > > We > > > > > can abandon the very idea of *defining* what consciousness is, and > > > > try > > > > > instead to focus on principles or statements about which we can > > > > agree > > > > > that they apply to consciousness. Then we can search for > > > > (mathematical) > > > > > object obeying to such or similar principles. This can be made > > > > easier > > > > > by admitting some theory or realm for consciousness like the idea > > > > that > > > > > consciousness could apply to *some* machine or to some > > > > *computational > > > > > events" etc. > > > > > > > > > > We could agree for example that: > > > > > 1) each one of us know what consciousness is, but nobody can prove > > > > > > > > > he/she/it is conscious. > > > > > 2) consciousness is related to inner personal or self-referential > > > > > modality > > > > > etc. > > > > > > > > > > This is how I proceed in "Conscience et Mécanisme". ("conscience" > > > > is > > > > > the french for consciousness, "conscience morale" is the french > > > > for the > > > > > english "conscience"). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In particular I don't think an AI could be expected to claim > > > > that it > > > > > > knows that it is conscious, that consciousness is a deep and > > > > intrinsic > > > > > > part of itself, that whatever else it might be mistaken about it > > > > could > > > > > > not be mistaken about being conscious. I don't see any logical > > > > way it > > > > > > could reach this conclusion by studying the corpus of writings > > > > on the > > > > > > topic. If anyone disagrees, I'd like to hear how it could > > > > happen. > > > > > > > > > > As far as a machine is correct, when she introspects herself, she > > > > > cannot not discover a gap between truth (p) and provability (Bp). > > > > The > > > > > machine can discover correctly (but not necessarily in a > > > > completely > > > > > communicable way) a gap between provability (which can potentially > > > > > > > > > leads to falsities, despite correctness) and the incorrigible > > > > > knowability or knowledgeability (Bp & p), and then the gap between > > > > > those notions and observability (Bp & Dp) and sensibility (Bp & Dp > > > > & > > > > > p). Even without using the conventional name of "consciousness", > > > > > machines can discover semantical fixpoint playing the role of non > > > > > expressible but true statements. > > > > > We can *already* talk with machine about those true unnameable > > > > things, > > > > > as have done Tarski, Godel, Lob, Solovay, Boolos, Goldblatt, etc. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > And the corollary to this is that perhaps humans also cannot > > > > > > legitimately > > > > > > make such claims, since logically their position is not so > > > > different > > > > > > from that of the AI. In that case the seemingly axiomatic > > > > question of > > > > > > whether we are conscious may after all be something that we > > > > could be > > > > > > mistaken about. > > > > > > > > > > This is an inference from "I cannot express p" to "I can express > > > > not > > > > > p". Or from ~Bp to B~p. Many atheist reason like that about the > > > > > concept of "unameable" reality, but it is a logical error. > > > > > Even for someone who is not willing to take the comp hyp into > > > > > consideration, it is a third person communicable fact that > > > > > self-observing machines can discover and talk about many non > > > > 3-provable > > > > > and sometimes even non 3-definable true "statements" about them. > > > > Some > > > > > true statements can only be interrogated. > > > > > Personally I don' think we can be *personally* mistaken about our > > > > own > > > > > consciousness even if we can be mistaken about anything that > > > > > consciousness could be about. > > > > > > > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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