I appreciate. I am not sure this will convince people, like Peter Jones, who assume the existence of a primary material world, and insists that a material implementation has to exist at some level for a computation to exist. I agree this is a poorly convincing sort of magical hand waving, but from a logical point of view an argument of the style of the movie-graph or Olympia is still needed.
Bruno On 10 Aug 2008, at 05:56, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > 1) Why 1 is more than 0 and simpler than n ? > > 'Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem'... It follows by > looking at it in a first sight that it would means the one universe > hypothesis is simpler than MW. Yes, one universe involves many less > than MW (either there exists a finite number of other universes or > infinitely many)... Then by O'R we should take the one universe > hypothesis as simpler because requiring less universes (in this case > 1). But it's an ill way of understanding O'R... It should be > understood as saying something about the premises, the axioms... One > shouldn't add an axiom unnecessarily. And in this case none of one > univers, 42 universes or infinitely many hypothesis are simpler > relative to each other... and O'R could not help you choose or if it > could help for something would be to choose the 0 univers > hypothesis... well 0 < 1 << oo and this for all values of 0 even big > ones :) > > 2) Why turing emulability of the mind entails first person > undeterminacy and/or MW ? > > Because if you're a computation then you're not dependant on the > substrate of the computation... but only to the computation itself. A > computation is substrate independant. > Well you'd say it may be substrate independent but still it needs a > substrate to 'exist'. Ok let's accept that, but let's return on the > mind and on the hypothesis that the mind is a computation and the > brain the substrate on which it is run. As a computation is substrate > independant then what follows is if the mind is a computation it can > be run on other computational substrate for example on a... computer > for example. And 'the mind' wouldn't be able to tell if it is run on a > brain or on a computer. By our hypothesis the mind is a computation, > and a computation is dependant only on it's state and transition rule, > if the same input is given to the same algorithm it will yield the > same result so seeing a brain is of no help because you would see a > brain even run somewhere else if the same input is given. > So why this entails first person undeterminacy and/or MW ? let's > assume we could replicate the computation of your mind (I have assume > by hypothesis that it is a computation, so replication can be done, > even if currently we don't have a clue and even we don't know if the > mind is a computation... but here I assume it just for the argument to > see what it entails) then I could execute the 'you' computation on a > computer then if I can, I can also run the 'you' computation not only > on one computer but on many computers. Ok so now I have at least two > computers running the same mind (computation)... I switch off one > computer, the mind die ? hell no, by our hypothesis mind is > computation and the computation is still running on the other > computer. So from the point of view of the mind unplugging one of the > two computers didn't change a thing. Now I'm a real serail killer I > switch of the last computer running the computation/mind... so now the > mind die now ?? Let's say I've done a program dump before stopping the > last computer and I decide 5 years later to rerun the computation from > this save point and on. Wasn't the mind dead ? If it is and mind == > the computation, how can I have the ability to run the computation > without it being the mind ? It means also that if you're a computation > you can't know at which 'level' you're run (if you're run on a VM > running in a VM running in a VM or a non emulated substrate). So if > mind is a computation to make correct prediction about the next state > you must take all computation having the same state into account. Even > using the 'real switch' theory a mind could be run on different 'real' > (composed of substance) substrate... and the mind will *have* to take > into account these runs on real substrate to make correct prediction. > And unplugging one real substrate run will not kill the mind, > unplugging them all also. The only way would be to not only unplug > them all but to garantee that it wil *never and ever* be run *again* > (even only one). > > > If I'm run on another computational substrate than > my brain, If someone pull the plug, I die ? > > Quentin Anciaux > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---