Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > >> >> On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >>> Hi, >>> >>> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >>> >>>> Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does >>>> not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an >>>> ontologically >>>> parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence. >>>> >>> Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable... >>> except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain >>> why that number (be it 1 or 42). >>> >> It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard >> cosmology accepts >> that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially >> unaccountable boundary conditions. >> >> >>> Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ? >>> >> The non-existence of unobserved entities. >> > > Plenty of thing are "unobserved", have you ever seen an electron ? > > >>>> One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does >>>> not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. >>>> >>> Well so ? >>> >> So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make >> other methodological approaches preferable. >> >> >>>>> Besides I find very >>>>> problematic the unicity. >>>>> >>>> Then you had better say what the problem is. >>>> >>> Why one ? >>> >> The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all- >> there-is? >> > > Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving. > > >>> why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single >>> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in >>> it, wow lucky. >>> >> Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else >> to be. >> "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking. >> >> > > Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the > everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...) > > > >>>> it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not >>>> fit the evidence because of the WR problem. >>>> >>> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of >>> the WR problem. >>> >> I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch >> off" WR's. >> > > Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as > easily. But we just make a step back and forth. > > >>>> The computation needs some sort of substrate. >>>> >>> *Any* substrate that can be use for doing a computation. Is a program >>> running in a simulated processor can know that the substrate (imagine >>> it has sensor to give information about it) is simulated if the >>> simulated processor gives out exactly what it should ? no... so the >>> substrate is nothing. >>> >> "There is no substrate" doesn't follow from "the substrate is >> unknown". >> > > The substrate is not part of the computation, it has never and never will. > > >>>>> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is >>>>> ontologically primary. >>>>> >>>> That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to >>>> argue for it. >>>> >>> I do not assume them. >>> >> Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. >> >> > > Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation > and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious > digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and > it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that > consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't > and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the > assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now > if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I > don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what > could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. > Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will > never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital > consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st > person indeterminacy... > > Regards, > Quentin Anciaux > But suppose we can create an AI, but we can't produce copies that don't diverge immediately; perhaps a consequence of the quantum no-cloning theorem. I realize that's probably not the case since it would require that computation of the complexity to produce consciousness must include so essentially quantum aspect. But would that imply "1st person indeterminacy" or not?
Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
